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a b s t r a c t 
We propose and advocate basic principles for the fusion of incomplete or uncertain information items, 
that should apply regardless of the formalism adopted for representing pieces of information coming 
from several sources. This formalism can be based on sets, logic, partial orders, possibility theory, belief 
functions or imprecise probabilities. We propose a general notion of information item representing in- 
complete or uncertain information about the values of an entity of interest. It is supposed to rank such 
values in terms of relative plausibility, and explicitly point out impossible values. Basic issues affecting 
the results of the fusion process, such as relative information content and consistency of information 
items, as well as their mutual consistency, are discussed. For each representation setting, we present 
fusion rules that obey our principles, and compare them to postulates speciﬁc to the representation pro- 
posed in the past. In the crudest (Boolean) representation setting (using a set of possible values), we 
show that the understanding of the set in terms of most plausible values, or in terms of non-impossible 
ones matters for choosing a relevant fusion rule. Especially, in the latter case our principles justify the 
method of maximal consistent subsets, while the former is related to the fusion of logical bases. Then 
we consider several formal settings for incomplete or uncertain information items, where our postulates 
are instantiated: plausibility orderings, qualitative and quantitative possibility distributions, belief func- 
tions and convex sets of probabilities. The aim of this paper is to provide a uniﬁed picture of fusion rules 
across various uncertainty representation settings. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). 
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T1. Introduction 
Information fusion is a speciﬁc aggregation process which aims
to extract truthful knowledge from incomplete or uncertain infor-
mation coming from various sources [15] . This topic is relevant in
many areas: expert opinion fusion in risk analysis [24] , image fu-
sion in computer vision [13,14] , sensor fusion in robotics [1,61,86] ,
database merging [18,21] , target recognition [78] , logic [67,68] and
so forth. Historically the problem is very old. It lies at the ori-
gin of probability theory whose pioneers in the XVIIth century
were concerned by merging unreliable testimonies at courts of law
[98] . Then, this problem fell into oblivion with the development
of statistics in the late XVIIIth century. It was revived in the late
XXth century in connection with the widespread use of computers,∗ Corresponding author at: IRIT, CNRS and Université de Toulouse, 118 Route de 
Narbonne, 31062 Toulouse Cedex 09, France.Tel.: +33 561556331. 
E-mail address: dubois@irit.fr (D. Dubois). 
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.inffus.2016.02.006 
1566-2535/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article und the necessity of dealing with large amounts of data coming
rom different sources, as well as the renewed interest toward pro-
ess human-originated information, and the construction of au-
onomous artefacts that sense their environment and reason with
ncertain and inconsistent inputs. 
Information fusion is often related to the issue of uncertainty
odelling. Indeed, sources often provide incomplete or unreliable
nformation, and even if such pieces of information are precise, the
act that they come from several sources often results in conﬂicts
o be solved, as inconsistency threatens in such an environment.
he presence of incomplete, unreliable and inconsistent informa-
ion leads to uncertainty, and the necessity of coping with it, so
s make the best of what is available, while discarding the wrong.
his is the role of information fusion. 
There are many approaches and formats to model informa-
ion, and several uncertainty theories [51] . The fusion problem
n the presence of uncertain or incomplete information has been
iscussed in each of these settings almost independently of thender the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). 
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2 Note that if x is a set-valued attribute, we do not consider the fusion of such 
precise set-values, e.g. x = A . But our approach encompasses the case of incomplete 
information for set-valued attributes [46] . For instance, if x is the precise time in- 
terval when the museum is open, a piece of information like “the museum is open 
from 9 to 12 h” is imprecise in the sense that what we know from it is that [9, ther ones [49,80,83,101] . Sometimes, dedicated principles have
een stated in order to characterise the speciﬁc features of the
usion process in the language of each particular formal setting
69,73,87,109] . Several fusion strategies exist according to the var-
ous settings. These strategies share some commonalities but may
iffer from each other in some aspects due to their speciﬁc repre-
entation formats (for instance, symbolic vs. numerical). 
This paper takes an inclusive view of the current available prop-
rties from different theories and investigates the common laws
hat must be followed by these fusion strategies 1 . We argue that
ome properties are mandatory and some are facultative only. The
atter can be useful in certain circumstances, or in order to speed
p computation time. It is interesting to notice that although each
equested property looks intuitively reasonable on its own, they
an be inconsistent when put together. This happens in the prob-
em of merging preferences from several individuals modelled by
omplete preorderings (Arrow impossibility theorem, see the dis-
ussion in [22] ). However, the basic mandatory properties of infor-
ation fusion we propose are globally consistent. 
The aim of the paper is to lay bare the speciﬁc nature of the
nformation fusion problem. This general analysis yields a better
nderstanding of what fusion is about and how an optimal fu-
ion strategy (operator) can be designed. In particular, informa-
ion fusion differs from preference aggregation, whose aim is to
nd a good compromise between several parties. Noticeably, while
he result of information fusion should be consistent with what
eliable sources bring about, a good compromise in a multiagent
hoice problem may turn out to be some proposal no party pro-
osed in the ﬁrst stand. So while they share some properties and
ethods, we claim that information fusion and preference aggre-
ation do not obey exactly the same principles. 
We also wish to show the deep unity of information fusion
ethods, beyond the particulars of each representation setting. To
his aim, we look at special characteristics of each theory and what
ecomes of fusion principles, what are the fusion rules in agree-
ent with these principles. We will check whether known fusion
ules in each theory comply with general postulates of information
usion. We explain how these basic properties can be written in
ifferent representation settings ranging from set-based and logic-
ased representations to possibility theory, belief function theory
nd imprecise probabilities. These comparisons demonstrate that
he proposed basic properties truly reﬂect the nature of fusion in
ifferent settings. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next sec-
ion presents general features of what can be called an informa-
ion item. Such features can be extracted from information items
n each representation framework. Section 3 presents basic princi-
les of information fusion that apply to information items and dis-
uss their relevance. Some additional and facultative principles are
iscussed. The problem of merging information is carefully distin-
uished from the one of preference aggregation. Section 4 instan-
iates our principles on the crudest representation of an informa-
ion item, as a set of possible values. When such a set basically
xcludes impossible values, we show that our setting characterises
he method of maximal consistent subsets. The case of merging
ropositional belief bases, for which a set of postulates, due to
onieczny and Pino-Perez [68] , exists, is then discussed. We com-
are them to our fusion principles, and show that the correspond-
ng Boolean information items in our sense correspond to subsets
f most plausible values. The next section discusses the fusion of
nformation items represented by plausibility rankings of possible
alues, going from ordinal representations to numerical ones in1 Preliminary and partial versions of this paper were presented in two confer- 
nces [37,38] . 
1
c
i
t
1erms of possibility distributions. Again, we compare our instan-
iated principles with existing proposals, and provide examples of
ational fusion rules in our sense. Finally the last section discusses
epresentations that blend set-based and probabilistic formalisms,
nd account for incomplete information, such as belief functions
nd imprecise probabilities. We instantiate our principles in each
etting, and study the property of known rules for merging belief
unctions. We also analyse postulates for merging imprecise prob-
bilities proposed by Peter Walley [109] in the light of our general
pproach. 
. A general setting for representing information items 
We call what sources of information provide to an end-user in-
ormation items pertaining to some uncertain entity. An informa-
ion item is understood as a statement, possibly tainted with un-
ertainty, forwarded by some source, and describing what the cur-
ent state of affairs is. In order to deﬁne a set of requirements that
ake sense in different representation settings ranging from logic
o imprecise probability, we need to describe several features of an
nformation item, that we consider essential. 
Consider a non-empty set of possible worlds or state descrip-
ions or alternatives, one of which is the true one, denoted by
 = { w 1 , . . . , w | W | } (it will often be the range of some unknown
recise entity denoted by x ). For simplicity, we restrict ourselves
o a ﬁnite setting. We assume that there are n agents/sources (sen-
ors, experts, etc.) and the i th one is denoted by e i . Let T i denote
he information item provided by agent e i about x . For example T i 
an be a set, a probability or a possibility distribution [42] , or an
rdinal conditional function [104] or a knowledge base. 
In this paper, we do not discuss the fusion of precise set-valued
ntities, such as multisets [17] , where sets represent complex en-
ities made of the conjunction of several, possibly identical ele-
ents, representing hierarchical data structures [19] , or related tu-
les in relational databases. Such multiset fusion problems can be
ound when cleaning databases containing duplicate data [18] or
or the summarisation of documents. On the contrary, sets used in
he representation of uncertain items of information contain mu-
ually exclusive values 2 . 
Here, an information item indicates which values or states of
ffairs in W are plausible, and which ones are not, for the uncer-
ain entity or parameter x , according to a source. In that sense an
nformation item is completely attached to the source that sup-
lies it and is not an objective description of the state of affairs.
t is a representation of knowledge that is likely to be modiﬁed by
dditional information. An information item T will then be charac-
erised by several features: 
• Its support S(T ) ⊆W, contains the set of values of x considered
not impossible according to information T . Namely, w ∈ S(T )
if and only if the value w is considered impossible for the
source offering T . One may see S(T ) as a kind of integrity con-
straint attached to T . If S(T ) = ∅ then information T is said to
be strongly inconsistent. The condition S(T )  = ∅ is a weak form
of (internal) consistency. 
• Its core C(T ) ⊆W, contains the set of values considered fully
plausible according to information T . One may see C(T ) as the2] ⊆x . If another source claims that “the museum is open from 14 to 17 h.” we may 
onclude that the museum is open from 9 to 12 h and from 14 to 17 h, which here 
s modelled by [9, 12] ∪ [14, 17] ⊆x . However this disjunction is actually obtained by 
he conjunctive fusion of two sets of time spans, namely { A : [9, 12] ⊆A } ∩ { A : [14, 
7] ⊆A }. 
14 D. Dubois et al. / Information Fusion 32 (2016) 12–39 
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 plausibility set attached to T . The idea is that, by default, if in-
formation T is taken for granted, a ﬁrst guess for the value of
x should be an element of C(T ) . Clearly, it follows that C(T ) ⊆
S(T ) , as the most plausible elements are to be found in the
support. An information item such that C(T )  = ∅ is said to be
strongly consistent . This strong form of internal consistency can
be requested for inputs of a merging process, but not necessar-
ily so for its result. In the following, we assume each source
provides strongly consistent information. 
• Its induced plausibility ordering : If consistent, information T in-
duces a partial preorder 	T (reﬂexive and transitive) on possi-
ble values, expressing relative plausibility 3 : w	T w ′ means that
w is at least as plausible as (or dominates ) w ′ according to T .
We write w ∼T w ′ if w	T w ′ and w ′ 	T w . The concept of plau-
sibility ordering corresponds to the idea of potential surprise
already discussed by Shackle [96] , namely a state of affairs is
all the more implausible as its presence is more surprising. Of
course, the plausibility ordering should agree with C and S, i.e.,
if w ∈ S(T ) , w ′ ∈ S(T ) , then w T w ′ ( w is strictly more plausible
than w ′ ). Likewise if w ∈ C(T ) , w ′ ∈ C(T ) . 
The triple (S(T ) , C(T ) , 	T ) is not redundant. Indeed, if only 	T 
is known, we still do not know if the least worlds according to 	T 
are possible or not, nor if the best worlds according to 	T are fully
plausible or not. So, while 	T provides relative information, the
sets S(T ) , C(T ) respectively point out impossible and fully plau-
sible worlds according to each source. 
Let us give a number of examples of formats for representing
information items: 
• Sets : T is of the form of a non-empty subset E T of W , represent-
ing all the mutually exclusive possible values for x according
to the information source. The set E T is often called a disjunc-
tive set, representing the information possessed by an agent (an
epistemic state). Then S(T ) = C(T ) = E T . And w 1 ∼T w 2 when
w 1 , w 2 both belong to E T or both belong to its complement.
Moreover, w 1 T w 2 , ∀ w 1 ∈ E T , and ∀ w 2 ∈ E T . An alternative
interpretation of E T is a set of plausible values, and then S(T ) =
W and C(T ) = E T . This latter view is sometimes used in belief
revision and the related approaches to fusion, as we shall see. 
Important special cases of set-valued information are 
• Vacuous information , expressing total ignorance is denoted
by T  . Then S(T  ) = C(T  ) = W and the plausibility order-
ing is ﬂat in the sense that w ∼T  w ′ ∀ w, w ′ ∈ W . 
• Complete knowledge expressing that the actual world is
known to be w is denoted by T w : then S(T w ) = C(T w ) =
{ w } . 
Note that T can take the form of a propositional knowledge
base K [68] ; then W is the set of interpretations of a propo-
sitional language L . Then E T = [ K] the set of models of K . Alter-
natively, if T represents information about a numerical parame-
ter, it may take the form of an interval [ a , b ] on the real line 4 .
This case is studied in more details in Section 4 
• Plausibility relations : we call an information item ordinal if it
consists of the triple (S(T ) , C(T ) , 	T ) . If only the plausibility
ordering is provided, one may accept that by default, the max-
imal elements according to 	T form the core of T . However,
we can ﬁnd examples of information items for which no world
is fully plausible. For instance, if 	T stems from a probability
distribution p , the most probable situation may not be very
probable: it is clear that { w : p(w ) = 1 } = ∅ , generally, since3 In some settings, there may exist several candidates for 	T , like the setting of 
belief functions, see Section 7 . In some cases, the plausibility ordering may be par- 
tial. 
4 Then, W is no longer ﬁnite; however, our setting can be extended to the inﬁnite 
case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 ∑ 
w ∈ W p(w ) = 1 . Likewise, by default we can assume the sup-
port of 	T is W itself unless otherwise speciﬁed. This case is
studied in more details in Section 5 . This format encompasses
the previous one when 	T is complete and induces only two
levels. 
• A possibility distribution [50] , namely a mapping π T : W → L
where L is a totally ordered set of plausibility levels, its bottom
0 encoding impossibility, and its top 1 encoding full plausibility.
The existence of a scale L is the key difference between this for-
mat and the one of plausibility relations, where we only have
	T , not π T . A possibility distribution π T is then more expres-
sive than the plausibility ordering it induces, as the use of scale
L enables the user to say that some situation is fully plausible
(and not only the most plausible) or some other is impossible
(and not only the least plausible). More numerical settings for
possibility distributions can be used. Then S(T ) = { w : π(w ) >
0 } is the support and C(T ) = { w : π(w ) = 1 } is the core in the
sense of fuzzy sets, viewing π T as a membership function of a
fuzzy set. The plausibility ordering 	T is induced by π T . Note
that the possibility scale L can be numerical or not. In the most
qualitative situation, it could be a ﬁnite chain of symbolic lev-
els. In contrast, we can let L = [0 , 1] and use numerical degrees
of possibility (often interpreted as upper probability bounds
[50] ). Alternatively, (im)possibility levels can be encoded by in-
tegers, as done by Spohn [104] . However, in that case the scale
is one of implausibility, namely a mapping κT : W → N such as
κT (w ) = 0 for normal situations, and w is all the less plausi-
ble as κT (w ) is greater (then one may let πT (w ) = k −κT (w ) for
some integer k > 1 [50] ). This case is studied in more details in
Section 6 . 
• A mass assignment m T that deﬁnes belief and plausibility func-
tions in Shafer’s theory of evidence [97] . A mass assignment is
formally a random set, i.e., a probability distribution over possi-
ble choices of epistemic states, m T ( E ) being the probability that
the best epistemic state representing T is E . This representa-
tion is more general than a mere probabilistic representation;
for the latter, m T ( E ) > 0 only if E is a singleton. One choice
of the induced triple (S(T ) , C(T ) , 	T ) can rely on the so-called
contour function (plausibility of singletons, understood as the
probability of hitting them by sets E ). This case is studied in
more details in Section 7 . 
• A convex set of probability measures [109] : it may represent ei-
ther a set of possible probabilistic information items (it is a sec-
ond order 0–1 possibility distribution) or the state of belief of
an agent described via desirable gambles (see Section 8.1 for
details). The triple (S(T ) , C(T ) , 	T ) is then for instance derived
from the upper probability of singletons. This more complex
case is studied in some details in Section 8 . 
Note that these frameworks are listed in increasing order of ex-
ressiveness, so that any information item expressible in one set-
ing can be encoded in the settings further down (possibly adding
ome extra information, for instance if we encode a plausibility re-
ation in the form of a possibility distribution). 
Finally we must be able to compare two items of information
n terms of their relative informativeness and their mutual consis-
ency. 
• Information ordering denoted by  : it is a partial preorder rela-
tion (reﬂexive, transitive) on information items. T  T ′ expresses
that T provides at least as much information as T ′ (said oth-
erwise: is more precise, more speciﬁc). In particular, the infor-
mation ordering is deﬁned such that T  T ′ implies S(T ) ⊆ S(T ′ )
and C(T ) ⊆ C(T ′ ) . It makes full sense if T is strongly consistent
( C(T )  = ∅ ), and its meaning becomes trival if T is strongly in-
consistent. In the case of set-based representations, this order-
ing coincides with set-inclusion, and in possibility theory, fuzzy
D. Dubois et al. / Information Fusion 32 (2016) 12–39 15 
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1 set inclusion. It is less obvious for ordinal plausibility represen-
tations (see Section 5 ) and belief functions (see Section 7 ) as
there are several options. The information ordering is also more
diﬃcult to deﬁne between pieces of information having empty
cores as it denotes some internal inconsistency that may over-
ride the notion of informativeness. 
• Imprecision index : this is a measure II ( T ) of how much informa-
tion is contained in an information item T . If T reduces to a set
of possible values E T , and then it can be the cardinality of E T in
the ﬁnite set setting (or its logarithm). More generally, it could
be some index of non-speciﬁcity for possibility measures or be-
lief functions [114,115] . 
Note that T  T ′ conveys more meaning than simply saying that
 
′ is more imprecise than T . The latter could be expressed by
omparing imprecision indices as II ( T ′ ) ≥ II ( T ). Actually, T  T ′ also
eans that T ′ can be derived from T : the relation  should be
iewed as a (generalised) entailment relation as well, while if II ( T ′ )
II ( T ), nothing forbids T and T ′ from being totally inconsistent
ith each other. 
• Mutual consistency : two items of information T and T ′ will
be called weakly mutually consistent if their supports overlap
( S(T ) ∩ S(T ′ )  = ∅ ), and strongly mutually consistent if their cores
overlap ( C(T ) ∩ C(T ′ )  = ∅ ). However, the latter property is vio-
lated by information items having empty cores as they already
display a form of internal inconsistency. 
We can give a number of examples of situations where such
inds of information item appear naturally: 
• In the merging of expert opinions, experts provide knowledge
about parameters of components of a complex system (for in-
stance, failure rate of a pump in a nuclear power plant), in
the form of an uncertainty distribution that can be a subjective
probability distribution [24] , or yet a likelihood function [57] ,
or a possibility distribution [94] . 
• The problem of syntax-independent merging of logical
databases [69] comes down to merging their sets of mod-
els. 
• In sensor fusion, information provided is often modelled by
random sets that account for reliability coeﬃcients [61,86] .
Namely, sensor readings can be mapped to a set of decision hy-
potheses modelled by mass functions [97] . 
. General postulates of information fusion 
Let T be the set of possible information items of a certain for-
at. It is assumed that the input information items are strongly in-
ernally consistent ( C(T i )  = ∅ ). A n -ary fusion operation f n is a map-
ing from T n to T , that operates the merging process: 
 = f n (T 1 , . . . , T n ) 
enotes the result of the fusion of a set of information items T i .
ollowing the terminology in [5] , a fusion operator is a collection
f fusion operations f n , n ∈ N , n ≥ 1 for all arities. By convention
f 1 (T ) = T . When this is not ambiguous we shall replace f n by f . 
The process of merging information items, supplied by sources
hose reliability levels are not known to differ from one another,
s guided by a few general principles, already proposed in [45,49]
hat we shall formalise in the following: 
• It is a basically symmetric process as the sources play the same
role and supply information of the same kind; 
• In the fusion process, we consider as many information items
as possible as reliable, so as to get a result that is as precise
and useful as possible, however not arbitrarily precise, if there
is not enough information to be precise. The result should be
faithful to the level of informativeness of the inputs. • Information fusion should solve conﬂicts between sources,
while neither dismissing nor favouring any of them without a
reason. 
A prototypical example of a fusion situation can be the follow-
ng. Suppose we have three witnesses i , each of whom provides
 piece of information T i . Suppose that T 2 and T 3 are compatible,
ut that the truth of T 1 is incompatible with T 2 and T 3 . In case
ll sources inform on the same issue, and are considered equally
elevant, an intuitively natural way of making the best of such in-
ormation is to consider the true situation to be in agreement with
ither the part of the information common to witnesses 2 and 3,
r with the information provided by witness 1. This is achieved
y a conjunctive combination of information items T 2 and T 3 fol-
owed by a disjunctive merging of the result with information item
 1 . It respects symmetry, does not dismiss any of the witnesses,
nd it is the most precise conclusion one may legitimately draw.
he purpose of this paper is to provide postulates embodying the
bove principles underlying the fusion process at work in such a
ind of situation, and to instantiate them in different formal set-
ings where the pieces of information T i can take various formats
ecalled in the previous section. In each case, we lay bare what is
he main fusion operation that respects these principles. 
A fusion operation with such an agenda was called arbitration
y Revesz [93] and taken over by Liberatore and Schaerf [73] , in
he set-theoretic or logical framework. These principles are im-
lemented in the postulates listed below, called basic properties ,
hich are meant to be natural minimal requirements, independent
f the actual representation framework. 
.1. Basic properties 
The postulates we consider essential and that any information
usion process should satisfy are as follows: 
Property 1: Unanimity 
The result of the fusion should propose values on which all
sources agree and reject those values rejected by all sources.
Formally it reads: 
(a) Possibility preservation : if all sources consider some
world is possible, then so should the result of the fu-
sion. It means in particular that 
n ⋂ 
i =1 
S(T i ) ⊆ S( f (T 1 , . . . , T n )) . 
(b) Impossibility preservation : if all sources believe that
some world is impossible, then this world is consid-
ered impossible after fusion. Mathematically, this can
be expressed as 
S( f (T 1 , . . . , T n )) ⊆ S(T 1 ) ∪ · · · ∪ S(T n ) . 
Property 2: Information monotonicity 
When a set of agents provides less information than another
set of non-disagreeing agents, then fusing the former set of
information items should not produce a result that is more
informative than fusing the latter set of information items.
Formally, it reads: 
If ∀ i, T i  T ′ i , then f (T 1 , . . . , T n )  f (T ′ 1 , . . . , T ′ n ) , provided that
inputs are globally strongly consistent ( C(T 1 ) ∩ · · · ∩ C(T n )  =
∅ ). 
Property 3: Consistency enforcement 
This property requires that fusing individually consistent in-
puts should give a consistent result. In particular, at the very
least one should require that 
S( f (T , . . . , T n ))  = ∅ . 
16 D. Dubois et al. / Information Fusion 32 (2016) 12–39 
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5 This name is borrowed from [93] , and [73] , but the Arbitration property here 
seems to be only loosely related to the notion of arbitration operation in the sense 
of [73] . Property 4: Optimism 
In the absence of speciﬁc information about source relia-
bility, one should assume that as many sources as possible
are reliable, in agreement with their observed mutual con-
sistency. In particular, 
• If all the inputs are mutually consistent, then the fusion
should preserve the information supported by every in-
put: 
If 
⋂ 
i C(T i )  = ∅ then f (T 1 , . . . , T n )  T i , ∀ i = 1 , . . . ,n . 
• If all the inputs are mutually inconsistent, it should be
assumed that at least one source is reliable. 
More generally, this basic property comes down to assuming
that any group of consistent sources is potentially reliable,
and at least one of this group is truthful. 
Property 5: Fairness 
The result of the fusion process should keep something from
each input, i.e., ∀ i = 1 , . . . ,n, S( f (T 1 , . . . ,T n )) ∩ S(T i )  = ∅ . 
Property 6: Insensitivity to vacuous information 
Sources that provide vacuous information should not affect
the result of fusion. That is, f n (T 1 , . . . , T i −1 , T  , T i +1 , . . . , T n ) =
f n −1 (T 1 , . . . , T i −1 , T i +1 , . . . , T n ) . 
Property 7: Commutativity 
Inputs from multiple sources are treated on a par, and the
combination should be symmetric. This is represented as
f (T 1 , . . . , T n ) = f (T i 1 , . . . , T i n ) for any permutations of indices.
Property 8. Minimal commitment 
The result of the fusion should be as little informative as
possible (in the sense of  ) among possible results that sat-
isfy the other basic properties. 
The basic properties proposed here in generality have counter-
parts in properties considered in some particular settings; see es-
pecially [109] for imprecise probability, [87] for possibility theory
and [68] for knowledge bases. We shall compare their proposals
with the above more general one in the sections devoted to these
speciﬁc frameworks. 
Besides, note that some of the above principles are expressed
using the supports of information items, and some others use their
cores. The choice was guided by the concern to make each prop-
erty as little demanding as possible, while still meaningful. This
choice can of course be debated, and some of these postulates can
be written using cores only, but their strength and possibly their
intuitive nature are then altered. However, some of these axioms
as stated above (1, 3, 5) trivialise when merging information items
whose support is W . This is discussed below. 
3.2. Arguing for the basic postulates and some variants 
In the following we provide the rationale of the above postu-
lates and discuss possible variants for them. 
3.2.1. Unanimity 
The corresponding basic postulate is the weakest form of una-
nimity one may require: accepting what is unanimously possible,
and rejecting what is unanimously impossible. This property ad-
mits of variants of various strength. First, one might replace sup-
ports by cores. Then, Property 1a means that the result should con-
sider as fully plausible at least all worlds judged fully plausible
by all sources (plausibility preservation). The core-based counter-
part to Property 1b is rather demanding and more debatable, as
the most plausible worlds after fusion could well be among worlds
that are not considered fully plausible by some source. 
A natural, often found, form of unanimity is: 
Idempotence : ∀ i, T = T , f (T , . . . , T n ) = T , i 1 However, adopting it in all situations forbids reinforcement ef-
ects to take place in case sources can be assumed to be indepen-
ent. Idempotence could be adopted if it is not known whether
he sources are independent or not [49] . If sources are indepen-
ent, one expects possible worlds judged somewhat implausible by
any sources to be more implausible globally. 
The basic postulate takes a form that leaves room to reinforce-
ent effects, while minimally respecting the agreement between
ources. It trivially implies that if all sources supply empty infor-
ation, the result of the fusion will be empty as well. Likewise if
ll information item supports are the same, the result of the fu-
ion will have the same support. For instance, if all sources claim
he only possible world is w, then so is the global result. 
Somewhat stronger than our postulate, yet weaker than idem-
otence is the following axiom that is used in social choice: 
Ordinal unanimity If ∀ i, 	T i = 	T , then 	 f (T 1 , ... ,T n ) = 	T . 
Ordinal unanimity can be restricted to each pair of worlds
(w, w ′ ) : 
Local ordinal unanimity 
∀ w, w ′ , if ∀ i, w 	T i w ′ , then w 	 f (T 1 , ... ,T n ) w ′ . 
Ordinal unanimity is a global notion that is weaker than local
rdinal unanimity since the global form only constrains the result
hen all information items T i generate the same plausibility order-
ngs, while the latter property only applies to the part of W × W
here all ordering relations coincide. Local Ordinal Unanimity is a
pecial case of the so-called Arbitration property used in knowl-
dge base merging [69] 5 , a variant of which can be written here in
he case of n sources: 
Arbitration if ∀ i = 1 , . . . , n, w 	T i w i , and ∀ i, j = 1 , . . . , n,
w i ∼ f (T 1 , ... ,T n ) w j , then ∀ i = 1 , . . . , n, w 	 f (T 1 , ... ,T n ) w i . 
.2.2. Information monotonicity 
This basic property should be restricted to when information
tems supplied by sources do not contradict each other. Indeed, if
onﬂicting, it is always possible to make these information items
ess informative in such a way that they become mutually consis-
ent. In that case the result of the fusion may become artiﬁcially
ery precise, by virtue of the Optimism postulate, and in particular,
ore precise than the union of the supports of original conﬂicting
tems of information (as the intersection of enlarged supports is
erformed). 
One can strengthen this postulate by requesting the preserva-
ion of strict relations: 
Strict information monotonicity If ∀ i, T i  T ′ i , and ∃ j, T j  T ′ j then
f (T 1 , . . . , T n )  f (T ′ 1 , . . . , T ′ n ) , whenever C(T 1 ) ∩ · · · ∩ C(T n )  =
∅ . 
This is generally too demanding in purely Boolean representa-
ion settings. Even set-intersection and set-union violate it. How-
ver, it makes more sense in numerical representation settings. 
.2.3. Consistency enforcement 
This postulate is instrumental if the result of the fusion is to
e useful in practice: one must extract something meaningful and
on-trivial, even if tentative, from the available information, even
f sources contradict one another. However, when the representa-
ion framework is suﬃciently reﬁned, there are gradations in con-
istency requirements, and this property can be interpreted in a
D. Dubois et al. / Information Fusion 32 (2016) 12–39 17 
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b  ore ﬂexible way. For instance, re-normalisation of belief functions
r possibility distributions obtained by fusion is not always com-
ulsory [99] , even if sub-normalisation expresses a form of incon-
istency. Likewise, in the symbolic setting, where knowledge is ex-
ressed by means of logical formulas, one may relax this assump-
ion by adopting a paraconsistent approach whereby each formula
s either supported, denied, unknown or conﬂicting with respect to
 set of sources (as for instance in the approach by Belnap [6] ). 
A more demanding variant of this postulate is obtained replac-
ng support by core. Then the enforcement of weak consistency is
eplaced by a requirement of strong consistency of the result. 
.2.4. Optimism 
This postulate underlies the idea of making the best of the
vailable information. If items of information are consistent and
o other information is otherwise available, there is no reason to
uestion the reliability of the sources. This means that if all the in-
uts are globally consistent with one another, then the information
rovided by each source should be preserved, i.e., f (T 1 , . . . , T n )) 
 i , ∀ i = 1 , . . . , n, or at least S( f (T 1 , . . . , T n )) ⊆ S(T i ) , ∀ i = 1 , . . . , n . In
hat case, we assume that they all supply correct information, so
hat the result should be more informative than, and in agreement
ith each original information item, which is clearly an optimistic
ttitude. This postulate is implicitly at work in belief revision [56]
s well, since in the AGM axioms 6 it is assumed that when the
ew information does not contradict the prior one, the revision
omes down to an expansion [2] , which is, in our sense, an op-
imistic fusion operation [32] . 
In case of inconsistent sources, this formal requirement is no
onger sustainable. Note when inputs are globally inconsistent
in particular, strongly so: 
⋂ 
i S(T i ) = ∅ ), and we accept Impos-
ibility Preservation property 1b, then the support of the result
hould be contained in the union of the supports of inputs, i.e.,
( f (T 1 , . . . , T n )) ⊆ S(T 1 ) ∪ · · · ∪ S(T n ) . This makes sense provided
hat at least one source is supposed to be reliable (still a form
f optimism). Requiring equality in the latter inclusion would be
 very cautious requirement (assuming that only one source is re-
iable). It sounds natural for two sources only, but may be found
vercautious in the case of many sources [45] . So one usually ex-
ects a strict inclusion S( f (T 1 , . . . , T n )) ⊂ S(T 1 ) ∪ · · · ∪ S(T n ) . More
peciﬁcally, one may expect that for each subset I of mutually con-
istent sources, there is a piece of information T I  T i , ∀ i ∈ I such
hat T I  f (T 1 , . . . , T n ) , and that (this is where optimism comes
n) f (T 1 , . . . , T n ) should be the most speciﬁc output satisfying this
ondition. One is led to choose I as a maximal set of consistent
ources, so as to select T I as informative as possible (although Min-
mal Commitment will prevent an arbitrarily precise choice). Of
ourse, there are several possible choices of maximal subsets I of
onsistent sources. 
.2.5. Fairness 
It ensures that all input items participate to the result. In par-
icular, when inputs are globally inconsistent (especially, 
⋂ 
i S(T i ) =
 ), the fusion result treats all sources on a par. For instance, if T 1 is
nconsistent with T 2 and T 3 that are mutually consistent, then hav-
ng S( f (T 1 , . . . , T n )) = S(T 2 ) ∩ S(T 3 ) is optimistic but it is unfair to
 1 . 
Fairness also implies no source is privileged in the following
ense: 
roposition 1. If the Fairness axiom is satisﬁed the following
roperty holds: 6 named from Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [2] . 
m  No Favouritism : the fusion result never implies any single input
nconsistent with some of the other inputs: it does not hold that
f (T 1 , . . . , T n )  T i for any T i such that ∃ j S(T j ) ∩ S(T i ) = ∅ , 
Proof Due to Fairness, if S(T j ) ∩ S(T i ) = ∅ then ∃ A i ⊆ S(T i ) , A j ⊆
(T j ) , non-empty sets such that A i ∪ A j ⊂ S( f (T 1 , . . . , T n ) . As a con-
equence S( f (T 1 , . . . , T n ) ⊆ S(T i ) , and so f (T 1 , . . . , T n )  T i . 
So this axiom favours no source by preventing any input in-
ormation item from being the global output result in case of in-
onsistency. Note that different versions of the idea of fairness can
e found in the literature. In particular, in [67,68] , where informa-
ion items are consistent knowledge bases with sets of models E i ,
hey propose the condition that f (E 1 , . . . ,E n ) ∩ E i  = ∅ either holds
or each i , or for none. The possibility that it holds for none (that
s, the result of the fusion may contradict all information items
n case of conﬂict) is a matter of debate from a knowledge fu-
ion point of view; it may be acceptable when fusing preferences,
hich is a matter of building a compromise, and also if the sets E i 
orrespond to cores of information items T i ; but it sounds strange
f they correspond to supports. In the latter case, as we assume no
nformation about reliability of sources, we take it for granted that
he ﬁnal result should keep some memory of all sources. Replacing
upports by cores in our fairness condition is more demanding and
ay sound questionable. 
One way to strengthen the Fairness axiom is to combine it with
ptimism and to require that the partial information from each
ource retained in the ﬁnal result be common to as many sources
s possible: 
Optimistic fairness : For any subset I of consistent sources,
S( f (T 1 , . . . ,T n )) ∩ 
⋂ 
i ∈ I S(T i )  = ∅ . 
This condition will improve the informativeness of the result,
s it will enforce values considered possible in the result to be in
greement with maximal consistent subsets of sources. 
.2.6. Insensitivity to vacuous information 
This one looks obvious, even redundant, but dispensing with it
ay lead to overly uninformative results. In fact, this postulate im-
licitly admits that a non-informative source is useless and irrele-
ant, and is assimilated to one that does not express any opinion.
n other words this postulate does not allow for interpreting the
nput as meta-information, like a source declaring that one cannot
now anything more informative than what is declared. There is no
contraction” 7 effect allowed by acquiring poor information. It is 
lso the only relationship explicitly requested at this level of gener-
lity, between fusion functions of different arities. This postulate is
ypical of information fusion, and excludes fusion rules like some
orms of averaging that are always sensitive to vacuous information
if represented by, for instance uniform distributions). Of course,
n some uncertainty theories, averaging is built-in, and is useful
e.g., in probability or belief function theories). But it arguably ad-
resses other tasks than the one considered here (like estimation,
here independence assumptions are needed, and precise obser-
ations are available, or the explicit discounting of sources [97] ,
hich is a form of contraction [2] ). 
.2.7. Commutativity 
This is really characteristic of fusion processes as opposed to re-
ision. Revision is about how input information should alter prior
nowledge. This process is fundamentally asymmetric: generally,
riority is given to the input information and the process is driven
y the minimal change principle [2,32] (the prior information is
inimally changed so as to accept the input information). On the7 In the sense of belief revision theory [2] . 
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d  contrary, the kind of fusion process we deal with here has to
do with information items obtained in parallel. So, commutativ-
ity makes sense, if no information is available on the reliability of
sources. One obvious objection against commutativity is that in-
formation items are often not equally reliable. However, a natural
way of handling an unreliable information item is to use the dis-
counting method [97] in order to get a reliable but less informa-
tive information item. Typically, assume a set-valued information
item of the form x ∈ T is reliable with probability p . Then this is
equivalent to an information item T p in the form of a random set
granting mass p to T and mass 1 − p to the whole set W . Then the
asymmetric merging of unreliable set-like information items comes
down to the symmetric merging of mass assignments in evidence
theory (in fact, possibility distributions π such that π(w ) = 1 , for
x ∈ T , and 1 − p otherwise). However, we do not consider priori-
tised merging where information coming from unreliable sources
is discarded if inconsistent with information coming from more re-
liable ones. This topic is discussed in [26] for logical databases. The
framework of prioritised merging can encompass both fusion and
revision. 
3.2.8. Minimal commitment 
This is a very important postulate that applies in many circum-
stances. It comes down to saying we should never express more
information than the one that is actually available. It appears in
all uncertainty theories in a speciﬁc form as we shall see later, in-
cluding in logic-based approaches. It is in some sense the converse
of the closed world assumption where any statement not explicitly
formulated is considered to be false. Here we consider possible any
state of affairs not explicitly discarded. This is a cautious principle
that is nicely counterbalanced by the Optimism postulate, and this
equilibrium is sometimes useful to characterise the unicity of fu-
sion rules: Optimism provides an upper limit to the set of possible
worlds and minimal commitment a lower limit. 
An important consequence of Optimism along with some of the
other postulates can be asserted: 
Proposition 2. Suppose 
⋂ 
i C(T i )  = ∅ . If a fusion operation f satisﬁes
Optimism and any of Possibility Preservation 1a or Minimal Commit-
ment, then for globally consistent information items T i , i = 1 , . . . , n,
we have S( f (T 1 , . . . , T n )) = 
⋂ 
i S(T i ) . 
Proof . From Optimism we have S( f (T 1 , . . . , T n )) ⊆
⋂ 
i S(T i ) .
From Minimal Commitment there is no other reason to discard
more possible worlds. Alternatively, Possibility Preservation en-
sures 
⋂ 
i S(T i ) ⊆ S( f (T 1 , . . . , T n )) , hence in either case, we get
S( f (T 1 , . . . , T n )) = 
⋂ 
i S(T i ) . 
Note that, in some representation settings, other postulates
than Optimism may further restrict the set of possible worlds. 
3.3. Facultative additional properties of fusion operations 
Some other properties are often either required or implicit in
information fusion. But they turn out to be debatable in some sit-
uations. 
3.3.1. Universality 
It has two complementary aspects: 
Unrestricted domain : ∀ T i ∈ T , ∃ T ∈ T , T = f (T 1 , . . . , T n ) . 
Attainability : ∀ T ∈ T , ∃ T 1 , . . . , T n ∈ T , such that T = f (T 1 , . . . , T n ) .
Universality is one used in social choice, but it may apply to any
aggregation problem. Indeed, Unrestricted Domain claims we must
be able to get a result whatever items of information are merged.
Moreover, Attainability says that no item of information should be
excluded as a possible result. Strictly speaking, Universality is in fact a consequence of our
ostulates since: 
• Attainability is trivially implied by Insensitivity to Vacuous In-
formation: ∀ T ∈ T , T = f (T , T  ) . 
• Consistency Enforcement is a strong version of Unrestricted Do-
main whereby the combined result should not only exist, but
be consistent. 
However, since we deﬁne the fusion operation as a mapping
rom T n to T , it requires the result be expressed in the same
ind of representation setting as the inputs. This feature introduces
 constraint on the possible fusion rules, that may be damaging
n some situations: it is a closure requirement (namely all results
hould lie in the class T ). For instance, merging knowledge bases
hould yield a single knowledge base (not a subset thereof), merg-
ng possibility distributions should yield a possibility distribution
not a more general object like a belief function structure), etc. So
his property could be relaxed to account for the possibility of in-
reasing the level of generality of the obtained result (allowing a
arger class of operations that yield results outside T , the most
eneral being convex probability sets), especially in the case of
onﬂicting inputs, or when the fact of forcing the result to be in
 rules out certain modes of fusion that sound natural in other
espects. For instance, merging probability measures into another
ne requires a weighted average [81] , which rules out conjunctive
nd disjunctive modes of fusion (that yield belief functions) [45] .
o we may in the following admit that in some situations, the re-
ult of the fusion is not necessarily a member of the speciﬁc class
 where inputs lie, but may lie in a larger class. 
.3.2. Non-sensitivity 
When merging consistent items, increasing (resp. decreasing)
he informativeness of one of them slightly should result in a
lightly more (resp. less) informative result. This is a property of
obustness of the aggregation operation, that sounds natural for
umerical aggregation schemes. It can be expressed as follows: 
For all n -tuples of globally consistent information items T i , i =
 , . . . , n, ∃ k > 0, such that ∀ j = 1 , . . . , n if T j  T ′ j , then 
( f (T 1 , . . . , T j , . . . , T n ) , f (T 1 , . . . , T j−1 , T ′ j , T j+1 , . . . , T n )) ≤ k · d(T j , T
or some informational distance d between pieces of information. 
Under the same consistency assumptions, Non-Sensitivity as
ormulated above is stronger than the mere continuity of the ag-
regation operation. Semantically, this property requires that fu-
ion should not be over-reactive to small informational changes.
ote that again this property may not make sense for conﬂicting
nputs, as they may become consistent in case of a small relax-
tion, thus possibly resulting in a dramatic change of the result,
f Consistency Enforcement and Fairness are respected. This is the
ase in a purely Boolean setting. In numerical settings, conjunc-
ive rules like Dempster rule of combination for belief functions
re even discontinuous in the presence of severely (but not fully)
onﬂicting information [45] . 
.3.3. Associativity 
f ( f (T 1 , T 2 ) , T 3 ) = f (T 1 , f (T 2 , T 3 )) . This property is useful to fa-
ilitate the computation of the fusion process, but it has no other
otivation pertaining to the nature of the fusion process. If a fu-
ion operation can be associative, so much the worth. However, the
ack of associativity is not a fatal ﬂaw (e.g., averaging operations
re not), if the fusion operation can be deﬁned for all arities. 
.3.4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIR): It means that the resulting relative plausibility between w
nd w ′ only depends on the relative plausibility between w and w ′ 
eclared by the sources. This is yet another property that comes
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f  
s  
o  
w  
a  
i  
c  
t  
e
3
 
i  
 
p  
e  
p  
s  
f  
c  
d  
c  
l  
a  
s  
i  
v  
r  
p  
o  
f  
 
A  
t  
a
3
 
a  
w  
t  
w  
g  
b  
t  
t  
a  
t  
m  
i
 
o  
t  
s  
o  
t  
s  
s  
a  
w  
a  
s  
o  
m  
a  
e  
s  
s  
i
 
e  
d  
r  
s  
l  
A  
m  
v  
t  
F
 
s  
l  
t  
i  
t
3
 
m  
w
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t  
O  
a
P  
(  
p
 
b
 
 
 
 
 
 
 rom social choice. It is satisﬁed by the union and intersection of
ets or fuzzy sets. However, in some settings, especially the one
f belief functions, the relative plausibility between two possible
orlds after fusion is inﬂuenced by other factors not just the rel-
tive plausibilities of the two worlds in the original information
tems. The same is true in general when pieces of information are
onﬂicting. So this property cannot be within the set of basic pos-
ulates. Nevertheless note that the Local Ordinal Unanimity prop-
rty underlies a form of IIR. 
.3.5. Majority 
Consider a countable set of non-vacuous information
tems { T 1 , T 2 , . . . } such that T i = T  = T 1 , ∀ i > 1 . Then ∃ n > 2 ,
f n (T 1 , . . . , T n ) = T . 
This property, which sounds very natural in the case of voting
rocesses, may also sound ﬁne for fusion processes if n is large
nough. It however implicitly presupposes that sources are inde-
endent and identical (similar to the statistical i.i.d. 8 assumption),
o that when n increases, the source that proposes something dif-
erent from other ones appears more and more like an outlier, and
an be dismissed. Otherwise in the case of not provably indepen-
ent sources, this property sounds debatable. And in fact, it is not
redible that in a real information fusion problem, there exists a
arge number of independent sources. If many sources are avail-
ble, it is very likely that some of them will be redundant (for in-
tance, it is hard to ﬁnd 100 experts agreeing on some issue of
nterest while having strictly different backgrounds). In the case of
oters, they are legally considered independent (even if they have
ead the same newspapers), so that the majority rule is used for
reference aggregation (see next subsection) to serve the purpose
f democracy. But it does not sound like a basic universal postulate
or information fusion. Finally it contradicts the Fairness axiom, as
f n (T 1 , . . . , T n ) eventually does not take T 1 into account any more.
gain, Majority presupposes a “the more, the more likely” assump-
ion, which we do not regard as universal unless one can be sure
bout the independence of sources. 
.4. Information fusion vs preference aggregation 
Information fusion takes a set of imperfect inputs (imprecise
nd uncertain) from different sources and produces a single output
hich should best reﬂect what is known about the true state of
he world. In other words, in this paper, information items model
hat the world is supposed to be. In the case of preference ag-
regation, the items of information reﬂect how the world should
e, according to sources that can represent individuals (in voting
heory) or criteria (in multifactorial evaluation) [107] . In a nutshell,
he aim of preference aggregation is to ﬁnd a compromise between
ntagonistic options, while the aim of information fusion is to ﬁnd
he truth. This difference of perspective implies that methods that
ake sense for preference aggregation may sound debatable for
nformation fusion. 
For example, if one source states that the room is hot while the
ther states the room is cold (e.g. sources are thermometers), then
he role of merging or fusion is to resolve such inconsistency, pos-
ibly by using some other kind of information such as reliability
f sources, in order to ﬁnd out a correct range of temperature. If
he two words hot and cold are viewed as totally incompatible de-
pite their fuzzy nature, the outcome is unlikely to be warm , a re-
ult that is not reported by any source. However, if when deciding
 duration for holidays, the husband prefers a short break of one
eek and the wife prefers a long vacation period of 4 weeks, then
 trade-off could be a two week holiday, a trade-off originally not8 Independent and identically distributed random variables. 
 uggested by any of the sources but plausibly acceptable by both
f them, eventually. Therefore, information fusion or knowledge
erging should focus on outcome(s) supported by some sources
nd not on possible worlds not suggested by any, whilst prefer-
nce aggregation tries to ﬁnd a compromise that maximises the
atisfaction of most parties involved (or in other words, minimise
ome kind of distance between the merged result and individual
nformation items), even if not previously suggested. 
Nevertheless the tools available for information fusion and pref-
rence aggregation clearly overlap, and so do the postulates that
elimit rational aggregation methods. For instance, the famous Ar-
ow axioms of voting apply to the fusion of total orderings and
ome of them are similar to some of our information fusion postu-
ates [22] . For instance, as explained above, Unrestricted Domain,
ttainability, and (ordinal) Unanimity are social choice axioms that
ake sense for ordinal information fusion. Independence of Irrele-
ant Alternatives may be hard to sustain for information fusion in
he face of inconsistency. But Non-Dictatorship is implied by the
airness axiom. 
As can be seen, our framework for information fusion is not the
ame as the framework for social choice and voting despite the re-
ationships existing between some of their postulates. In particular,
he Optimism, Minimal Commitment, and Information Monotonic-
ty postulates of information fusion have no counterpart in voting
heory. 
.5. Basic information aggregation modes 
Based on the deﬁnition of information items T i and their infor-
ational ordering, several aggregation modes can be deﬁned, that
ill be instrumental for constructing fusion operations: 
1. Conjunctive operators: a conjunctive operator is a commutative
function c n : T n → T such that c n (T 1 , . . . , T n )  T i , ∀ i = 1 , . . . , n ;
a cautious conjunctive operator is a minimally committed con-
junctive operator, that is one such that c n (T 1 , . . . , T n ) is maximal
for  . 
2. Disjunctive operators: a disjunctive operator is a commutative
function δn : T n → T such that T i  δn (T 1 , . . . , T n ) , ∀ i = 1 , . . . , n ;
an optimistic disjunctive operator is a maximally committed
disjunctive operator, that is one such that δn (T 1 , . . . , T n ) is min-
imal for  . 
Conjunctive operators can be used for information fusion when
he inputs are not mutually inconsistent (overlapping supports).
therwise, they may fail the Consistency Property, hence Fairness,
nd Minimal Commitment. 
roposition 3. When inputs are not strongly globally inconsistent
overlapping supports), cautious conjunction operators obey all basic
roperties of fusion. 
Proof . We use the fact that T 1  T 2 imply the similar inclusions
etween supports and between cores. 
• For possibility preservation, note that the cautiousness as-
sumption implies that S(c n (T 1 , . . . , T n )) = 
⋂ 
i S(T i ) (otherwise
c n (T 1 , . . . , T n ) would not be maximal for  ). It also implies Fair-
ness. Impossibility preservation is obvious. 
• Information monotonicity holds as if T i  T ′ i the condition
c n (T 1 , . . . , T n )  T i is more demanding than c n (T 1 , . . . , T n ) 
T ′ 
i 
, so that there is a minimally committed result
c n (T 1 , . . . , T 
′ 
i 
, . . . , T n ) that is equal to or less informative than
c n (T 1 , . . . , T n ) . 
• Consistency Enforcement: by construction, since 
S(c n (T 1 , . . . , T n )) = 
⋂ 
i S(T i )  = ∅ . It will hold in the strong
sense if the cores intersect. 
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Table 1 
Properties of general conjunctive, disjunctive and adaptive operations. 
Properties Cautious Optimistic Cautious Bold 
conjunction disjunction adaptive adaptive 
Unanimity Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Information monotonicity Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Consistency enforcement No Yes Yes strong Yes 
Optimism Yes No Yes Yes 
Fairness No Yes Yes Yes 
Insensitivity for vacuous Yes No Yes Yes 
Commutativity Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Minimal commitment No No Yes Yes 
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c  • Optimism, Commutativity, Minimal commitment, by construc-
tion. 
• Insensitivity to vacuous information is obvious since the
condition c n (T 1 , . . . , T n )  T i = T  is a tautology. And so
c n (T 1 , . . . , T n ) = c n −1 (T 1 , . . . , T i −1 , T i +1 , . . . , T n ) . 
Note that if the supports of inputs are globally inconsistent,
then Consistency Enforcement fails for cautious conjunctive op-
erations, hence Fairness and Minimal Commitment as well. Dis-
junctive operators are not optimistic (even when they are called
optimistic) when the inputs are mutually consistent (overlapping
cores). 
Adaptive aggregation schemes can then be devised. In the case
of two inputs: 
• A binary cautious adaptive aggregation operation ac is deﬁned
by means of a cautious conjunctive aggregation c 2 and an opti-
mistic disjunctive one δ2 : 
ac(T 1 , T 2 ) = 
{
c 2 (T 1 , T 2 ) if C(T 1 ) ∩ C(T 2 )  = ∅;
δ2 (T 1 , T 2 ) otherwise. 
(1)
• A binary bold adaptive aggregation operation ab is deﬁned by 
ab(T 1 , T 2 ) = 
{
c 2 (T 1 , T 2 ) if S(T 1 ) ∩ S(T 2 )  = ∅;
δ2 (T 1 , T 2 ) otherwise. 
(2)
The difference between the two adaptive aggregations is the
condition under which the conjunctive aggregation is applied. In
the cautious case, the conjunction is used only if the inputs are
strongly mutually consistent. 
Proposition 4. Cautious and bold adaptive aggregation operations
satisfy the eight basic properties. A cautious one satisﬁes strong ver-
sions of Consistency Enforcement and Fairness (using cores). 
Proof . 
• For Unanimity, if the two inputs are strongly mutually consis-
tent, it follows from Proposition 3 , as both operations reduce
to cautious conjunctive ones. If the inputs are weakly mutu-
ally consistent or inconsistent, Unanimity is obvious for the
cautious adaptive aggregation (since disjunctions preserve pos-
sibility and impossibility). For the bold one, if the inputs are
weakly mutually consistent it reduces to a conjunction, but
then S(c n (T 1 , . . . , T n )) = 
⋂ 
i S(T i ) holds to respect maximality
w.r.t.  . 
• Information monotonicity follows from Proposition 3 , Consis-
tency Enforcement is obvious and is even strong for the cau-
tious adaptive operation. 
• Optimism of the cautious adaptive aggregation is built-in if
strong Consistency Enforcement is required. For the bold one, it
is even more optimistic at the expense of getting a result with
empty core (if cores are disjoint, then c 2 ( T 1 , T 2 ) has an empty
core). 
• Insensitivity for Vacuous information follows from the fact that
ac(T 1 , T 
 ) = ab(T 1 , T  ) = c 2 (T 1 , T  ) and by Proposition 3 . 
• Fairness, Commutativity, Minimal commitment are obvious
by construction. For the cautious adaptive aggregation, ∀ i =
1 , . . . ,n, C(ac(T 1 , . . . ,T n )) ∩ C(T i )  = ∅ (when ac = c 2 this is obvi-
ous, and otherwise it is a disjunctive aggregation whose core
includes all cores of all T i ’s). So this is a strong form of fairness.
These results are summarised by Table 1 . The case of n -ary
adaptive fusion rules is considered later in the paper. 
4. Merging set-valued and Boolean information 
Having proposed a set of general postulates for information fu-
sion, the next step is to demonstrate the existence of fusion ruleshat obey these postulates. This question can be posed in the var-
ous settings that can be envisaged for representing information
tems. Moreover, we should compare our set of postulates with ex-
sting proposals in more specialised settings. The most elementary
etting one may ﬁrst consider is the one of sets, whereby any infor-
ation item is a subset of possible worlds, one of which being the
ctual world, the simplest account of an epistemic state. This set-
ing is important because it is the simplest information represen-
ation framework and also has connections with knowledge base
erging in Boolean logic, where fusion postulates were proposed
y Konieczny and Pino-Perez [68,69] . 
.1. Merging set-valued information: hard constraints 
Let us assume that the information items T i are deﬁned by clas-
ical subsets E i ⊆W representing plain epistemic states, so that here
 = 2 W \ {∅} . In this subsection, the triple (S(T ) , C(T ) , 	T ) is de-
ned as follows: 
• Core and Support coincide: C(T ) = S(T ) = E ⊆W . 
• Plausibility ordering induced by T : w T w ′ if w ∈ E and w ′ ∈ E,
while w ∼T w ′ if w, w ′ ∈ E or w, w ′ ∈ E. 
Note that this choice is not unique. One could also decide that
(T ) = W (as in the next subsection). Instead we study here the
ase where any world w ∈ E is considered impossible (for instance,
he fusion of integrity constraints). 
It is clear that T is consistent if and only if E is not an empty
et, and the information ordering relation  is set inclusion ⊆.
hen all the basic properties can be naturally adapted to the
oolean representation. In order to characterise a canonical fusion
ule, though, only three axioms among the eight ones are needed
o ensure uniqueness in the case of two sources [32] : 
• Optimism: If E 2 ∩ E 1  = ∅ , then both f ( E 1 , E 2 ) ⊆ E 1 and
f ( E 1 , E 2 ) ⊆ E 2 hold. 
• Unanimity : E 2 ∩ E 1 ⊆ f ( E 1 , E 2 ) ⊆ E 2 ∪ E 1 . 
• Minimal commitment : f ( E 1 , E 2 ) is the largest subset of possible
worlds obeying Optimism and Unanimity. 
roposition 5. If there are two sources, the only fusion rule that sat-
sﬁes Optimism, Unanimity and Minimal Commitment is 
f 2 (E 1 , E 2 ) = 
{
E 2 ∩ E 1 if E 2 ∩ E 1  = ∅ 
E 2 ∪ E 1 otherwise . 
(3)
Proof . in the consistent case, Optimism and Unamimity im-
ly f 2 (E 1 , E 2 ) = E 1 ∩ E 2 , and otherwise, Minimal commitment and
nanimity imply f 2 (E 1 , E 2 ) = E 1 ∪ E 2 . 
It is clear that the above three axioms imply the other ﬁve
nes for two sources: The intersection operation is information-
onotonic, the fusion rule always yields a consistent outcome if
nputs are consistent. Fairness obviously holds as the result clearly
eeps track of the two information items. The above fusion rule is
ommutative, and is not sensitive to vacuous information items (as
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a  he latter are always less informative than the other items in the
ense of relation  ). It is a ﬁrst example of adaptive aggregation.
his framework leaves room for just one such aggregation (ﬁrst ad-
ocated in [43] ). 
The rationale for such a fusion rule is clear: in case of consis-
ent sources, we assume both are reliable and increase the preci-
ion accordingly; if they are mutually inconsistent, the fusion rule
oes not take sides and remains optimistic by assuming one source
t least yields correct information. This way of tackling inconsis-
ency is similar to variable forgetting in logical knowledge bases
70] (if W contains two elements only, E 1 ∪ E 2 is vacuous). 
This rule exhibits a discontinuous behaviour when moving from
 consistent situation to an inconsistent one, since the less the two
ubsets overlap, the more precise the result of fusion, until a total
ontradiction appears and then the result suddenly becomes im-
recise. However, nothing forbids independent sources to provide
nformation items having a narrow intersection. In that respect, the
et representation is too rigid, and it pleads for a more ﬂexible rep-
esentation setting where inconsistency can be a matter of degree
some approaches get rid of inconsistency in fusion problems by a
imilarity-based enlargement of the sets of interpretations of infor-
ation items [95] ). 
An obvious consequence of Proposition 5 this result is that the
ssociativity postulate is inconsistent with the eight information
usion postulates. Indeed the canonical fusion rule they charac-
erise in the set-valued setting is clearly not associative. For in-
tance, suppose three sources providing E i , i = 1 , 2 , 3 where E 1 ∩
(E 2 ∪ E 3 ) = ∅ while E 2 and E 3 are consistent. Then 
• f 2 (E 1 , f 2 (E 2 , E 3 )) = f 2 (E 1 , E 2 ∩ E 3 ) = E 1 ∪ (E 2 ∩ E 3 ) 
• f 2 ( f 2 (E 1 , E 2 ) , E 3 )) = f 2 (E 1 ∪ E 2 ) , E 3 ) = E 2 ∩ E 3 
The origin of this incompatibility between Associativity and the
ight postulates of information fusion lies in the Consistency En-
orcement property, which implies the Unrestricted Domain pos-
ulate. The former is never satisﬁed by known fusion rules. For
nstance, Dempster rule of combination for belief functions is as-
ociative but is not deﬁned for totally inconsistent belief functions
see Section 7 ). The lack of associativity forces us to directly deﬁne
he n -ary counterpart of the basic fusion rule. 
If the inputs are globally consistent, i.e., if 
⋂ n 
i =1 E i  = ∅ , Opti-
ism and Possibility Preservation imply f n (E 1 , . . . , E n ) = 
⋂ 
i E i . This
s a direct consequence of Proposition 2 . Let I ⊂{ 1 , . . . ,n }be a maxi-
al consistent subset (MCS) of information items, i.e., T I = ⋂ i ∈ I E i  =
 and T I∪{ j} = ∅ , ∀ j ∈ I. Let T I and T I ′ be the results of the conjunc-
ive combination of the information items given by two MCSs I and
 
′ , then T I ∩ T I ′ =∅ , by construction. 
There is a generalisation of the two-source combination rule
3) characterised by our postulates, namely the maximal-consistent
ubset fusion rule (MCS): 
f MCS n (E 1 , . . . , E n ) = 
⋃ 
I∈ MCS({ 1 , ... ,n } ) 
⋂ 
i ∈ I 
E i (4)
here MCS({1,..., n }) is the set of maximal consistent subsets of
ources. It was ﬁrst proposed by Rescher and Manor already in
970 [92] . This operator extends (3) to n sources. Indeed, in the
ase of 2 sources, MCS({ 1 , 2 } ) = {{ 1 , 2 }} (hence the conjunction
ule) or {{1}, {2}} (hence the disjunction rule). We can prove that
ur axiomatic framework for set-fusion characterises the MCS fu-
ion rule, if we take an optimistic view of the Fairness axiom: 
roposition 6. Suppose the information items take the form of sets.
 fusion rule satisﬁes Consistency Enforcement, Optimism, Optimistic
airness, and Minimal Commitment if and only if it is the MCS fusion
ule. 
Proof . Due to Consistency Enforcement and Fairness postulate,
f n (E , . . . , E n ) = A ∪ · · · ∪ A n for non-empty sets A ⊆ E . Now due1 1 i i o Optimism and Optimistic Fairness, if I is a maximal consistent
ubset, one should select A i = A I ⊆ E i , i ∈ I; it means that no set of
ources strictly containing I can be assumed to be simultaneously
eliable, but nothing prevents the set I from containing reliable
ources only. As a consequence f n (E 1 , . . . , E n ) = 
⋃ 
I∈ MCS({ 1 , ... ,n } ) A I .
ow due to minimal commitment, there is no reason to choose
 
I ⊂⋂ i ∈ I E i , as this choice would be arbitrary. Hence A I = ⋂ i ∈ I E i .
o this is the MCS fusion rule. 
It is obvious MCS satisﬁes the other basic properties 1, 2, 6, 7.
t is clear that the MCS fusion rule does not take into account the
umber of sources supplying the same information item. The du-
lication of sources does not affect the result of the MCS rule. It
atisﬁes the following property [68] : 
Majority-Insensitivity : if E 1 = E 2 = · · · = E n = E, then 
f n +1 (E 0 , E 1 , . . . , E n ) = f 2 (E 0 , E) , ∀ n > 1 . 
Another way to circumvent the opposite drawbacks of conjunc-
ive and disjunctive fusion modes (the former leading to contra-
iction as more sources are involved and the latter leading to un-
nformativeness), one may use so-called k -quota merging opera-
ors. A k -quota merging operator selects a subset of k sources that
re jointly consistent and performs a conjunctive operation over
hem. If there are several such groups of k sources one may per-
orm the union of the partial results. Using the principle of opti-
ism, one is led to use a value of k that is as large as possible. It
hen comes down to selecting the subset of most numerous max-
mal consistent subsets of sources. Fusion rules of this kind can
e found in [52,54,91] . They are intermediary between conjunctive
nd disjunctive fusion modes and are not majority-insensitive. This
uota-merging rule satisﬁes most basic postulates, but it fails the
airness axiom as the information from sources other than the k
elected ones is discarded; one may consider it also fails the mini-
al speciﬁcity requirement due to the selection process that picks
he largest group of jointly consistent sources, which may sound
uestionable unless sources are considered independent. 
.2. The axioms of arbitration 
It is interesting to compare the set-based instantiations of our
eneral postulates to the axioms of arbitration after Liberatore and
chaerf [73] . They consider ﬁve postulates (here couched in our
erminology), applied to two sets of possible worlds (however pos-
ibly empty), as basic: 
• A closure assumption: f ( E 1 , E 2 ) is a set (implicit in [73] ). 
• Commutativity. 
• Possibility preservation, which here reads: E 1 ∩ E 2 ⊆ f ( E 1 , E 2 ). 
• Optimism (as restored in this subsection). 
• Consistency, expressed as f (E 1 , E 2 ) = ∅ if and only if E 1 = E 2 =
∅ . 
The latter are four of our basic postulates and the ﬁrst one is
aken for granted by deﬁnition of the fusion operation. They pro-
ose additional postulates as follows: 
• Disjunctive decomposability: f (E 1 , E 2 ∪ E 3 ) = f (E 1 , E 2 ) or
f ( E 1 , E 3 ) or yet f ( E 1 , E 2 ) ∪ f ( E 1 , E 3 ). 
• Impossibility preservation, which here reads f ( E 1 , E 2 ) ⊆ E 1 ∩ E 2 
• Fairness: if E 1  = ∅ , f ( E 1 , E 2 ) ∩ E 1  = ∅ . 
Clearly the two last of these additional axioms are among
ur basic postulates. In the set-theoretic representation, these
ostulates are not independent, as shown in [73] ; for instance
mpossibility Preservation and Fairness are consequence of the
ther six ones. Moreover, they show that an arbitration operation
s of the form f (E 1 , E 2 ) = A ∪ B for some subsets A ⊆ E 1 , B ⊆ E 2 ,
nd f (E , E ) = E ∩ E if the inputs are consistent. Note that if1 2 1 2 
22 D. Dubois et al. / Information Fusion 32 (2016) 12–39 
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A  E 1 ∩ ( E 2 ∪ E 3 )  = ∅ then f (E 1 , E 2 ∪ E 3 ) = E 1 ∩ (E 2 ∪ E 3 ) (due to Opti-
mism and Possibility Preservation), which is of the form prescribed
by Disjunctive decomposability. 
Although written for two inputs, the above axioms can eas-
ily be written for n inputs but for Disjunctive decomposability.
It is also clear that in the case of n inputs, arbitration takes
the form 
⋃ 
I∈ MCS({ 1 , ... ,n } ) A I , where A I ⊂
⋃ 
i ∈ I E i (see the proof of
Proposition 6 ). 
The Liberatore and Schaerf postulates do not include Informa-
tion Monotonicity, Insensitivity to Vacuous Information (which is
a trivial property of arbitration), nor Minimal Commitment. It is
clear that the only minimally committed arbitration operation is
our adaptive operation (3) . Note that it is Minimal Commitment
that ensures the unicity of our fusion rule (3) . This cautiousness
assumption is absent from [73] , in which it is assumed (like in the
AGM revision setting) that the inputs E i underlie more informa-
tion than what is explicitly represented, under the form of weak
plausibility orders ≥ i , so that f (E 1 , E 2 ) = A ∪ B where A (resp. B )
is formed by the maximally plausible elements of E 1 for ≥ 2 (resp.
E 2 for ≥ 1 ). Liberatore and Schaerf [73] also mention Information
Monotonicity, albeit without the restriction to consistent inputs,
thus getting trivialisation results. 
These results shed light on the rationale of our axiomatic set-
ting. Our view of fusion is more a matter of displaying a cau-
tious but useful synthesis of the information provided by several
sources, than one of making a ﬁnal decision that would be the re-
sult of a choice between sources. Moreover, it implicitly assumes
that if several sources deliver the same hard constraint, it means
they may be dependent. As argued above, this assumption is some-
times all the more plausible as the number of sources is high if
sources are experts. 
When sources provide observations resulting from processes
designed to be independent, as in statistics, repeated information
matters. For instance, one can count the number of sources that
state E i = E, say n E . In the latter case one would get a belief func-
tion with focal sets E i , and a mass function m (E) = n E n , which is
a kind of fusion rule which does not respect the closure property,
since then f n (E 1 , . . . , E n ) = m ∈ T . Note that the contour function
πm (s ) = 
∑ 
s ∈ E m (E) consists in averaging the characteristic func-
tions of the E i , i.e., πm (s ) = |{ i : s ∈ E i }| n , which is intermediary be-
tween conjunction and disjunction. It gives a fuzzy set as the result
of the fusion. However, if the result of the fusion of sets should be
a set, there is hardly any way of expressing a reinforcement effect
due to identical and independent information items. 
The MCS rule is in this sense a cautious combination rule. The
fact that we retrieve a well-known, probably the oldest approach
to handling inconsistency in logic-based representations comforts
the idea that these postulates are natural. However, it prompts us
to compare this setting with the one of knowledge-based merging,
that seems to argue against fusion methods obeying Impossibility
Preservation. 
4.3. Logic-based merging: the fusion of plausible sets 
Knowledge base merging addresses how a set of logical formu-
lae in propositional logic obtained from different agents should be
merged in order to obtain a consistent set of formulae. 
A commonly accepted set of postulates for judging a logic-
based merging operator was proposed in [68] . We consider a
propositional language L PS deﬁned on a ﬁnite, non-empty set P
of propositional atoms, which are denoted by p , q , r etc. A propo-
sition (or formula) φ is constructed by propositional atoms with
logical connectives ¬, ∧ , ∨ , → in the standard way. An interpreta-
tion w (or possible world) is a function that maps P onto the set
{0, 1}. The set of all possible interpretations on P is denoted by W .
Function w can be extended to any propositional sentence in L P inhe usual way, w : L P → { 0 , 1 } . An interpretation w is a model of
or satisﬁes) φ if and only if w (φ) = 1 , denoted by w | φ. We use
od ( φ) to denote the set of models for φ. 
A (ﬂat) knowledge base K is a ﬁnite set of propositions. K can be
quivalently expressed as a formula φ consisting of the conjunc-
ion of formulas in K . A knowledge proﬁle is a multi-set of propo-
itional formulas E = { φ1 , φ2 , . . . , φn } . The conjunction of formu-
as in E is ∧ E = φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn . E is called consistent if and only if
 E is consistent. E 1 ↔ E 2 denotes that there is a bijection g from
 1 = { φ1 1 , . . . , φ1 n } to E 2 = { φ2 1 , . . . , φ2 n } such that  f ( φ) ↔ φ. We de-
ote by E 1 
⊔ E 2 the multi-set union of E 1 and E 2 . 
An operator  is a mapping from knowledge proﬁles to knowl-
dge bases, and  is a KP-merging operator (after Koniecny and
ino-Pérez [68] ) if and only if it satisﬁes the following postulates
68] . 
A1 (E ) is consistent. 
A2 If E is consistent, then (E ) = ∧ E . 
A3 If E 1 ↔ E 2 , then  (E 1 ) ↔ (E 2 ) . 
A4 If φ1 ∧ φ2 is not consistent, then ({ φ1 , φ2 } )  φ1 . 
A5 (E 1 ) ∧ (E 2 )  (E 1 ⊔ E 2 ) . 
A6 If (E 1 ) ∧ (E 2 ) is consistent, then (E 1 
⊔ E 2 )  (E 1 ) ∧
(E 2 ) . 
These postulates are described at the syntax-level, e.g., formula-
evel, whilst the common properties we proposed above are repre-
ented at the semantic level, e.g., possible worlds level. However,
ince axiom A3 assumes syntax independence, these postulates can
e written at the semantic level in terms of merging sets of pos-
ible worlds, which is the representation setting of this section,
ithout loss of content. Let E i = Mod(φi ) be the set of models of φi 
nd we use notation f  instead of  to denote a fusion operation
beying the KP axioms. 
Then the KP postulates (minus A3, trivially true) can be equiv-
lently stated as: 
A1 ∗ f (E 1 , . . . , E n )  = ∅ . 
A2 ∗ If E 1 ∩ ∩ E n  = ∅ , then f (E 1 , . . . , E n ) = E 1 ∩ · · · ∩ E n . 
A4 ∗ If E 1 ∩ E 2 = ∅ , then f (E 1 , E 2 )  E 1 . 
A5 ∗ f n (E 1 , . . . , E n ) ∩ f m (E ′ 1 , . . . , E ′ m ) ⊆ f m + n (E 1 , . . . , E n , 
E ′ 
1 
, . . . , E ′ m ) . 
A6 ∗ If f n (E 1 , . . . , E n ) ∩ f m (E ′ 1 , . . . , E ′ m )  = ∅ , then 
f m + n (E 1 , . . . , E n , E ′ 1 , . . . , E ′ m ) ⊆ f n (E 1 , . . . , E n ) ∩ 
f m (E 
′ 
1 , . . . , E 
′ 
m ) . 
A1 ∗–A6 ∗ can be interpreted as follows in the light of our set-
ing. A1 ∗ is the Consistency Enforcement axiom. A2 ∗ is implied by
ur information fusion postulates, after Proposition 2 . It is a con-
equence of Optimism and Possibility Preservation: it presupposes
hat consistent sources are reliable. A4 ∗ is a consequence of our
airness axiom ( Proposition 1 ). It does not prevent the result from
eing inconsistent with φ1 and φ2 , should they be inconsistent.
his is the main difference with arbitration operators. A5 ∗ and A6 ∗
ogether state that if it is possible to ﬁnd two subgroups which
gree on at least one possible world, then the result of global fu-
ion will contain exactly those possible worlds the two subgroups
gree on. 
The KP framework is thus different from ours. The axioms A1
o A4 have set-valued counterparts that are consequences of our
etting, but A5 ∗ and A6 ∗ are not presupposed by our framework. In
act, as the MCS rule is characteristic of our postulates, and since it
atisﬁes the Majority-Insensitivity property, it follows that it does
ot satisfy A5 ∗ and A6 ∗. Indeed Konieczny and Pino-Perez [68] in-
icate that the Majority-Insensitivity property is incompatible with
heir axiomatic setting A1–A6 (and they propose a weak version of
t). 
So, how do they deﬁne merging operators? In fact, the use of
5 and A6 forces them into a more expressive framework than the
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pne of sets, namely, the one of partially ordered epistemic states. A
ubset of possible worlds viewed as an epistemic state E i is inter-
reted as a so called syncretic assignment , which is a partial plausi-
ility order 	i on W attached to E i such that all maximal elements
or this plausibility order are those of E i . In fact, we are back to the
riple T i = (S(T i ) , C(T i ) , 	i ) where conditions are expressed in our
etting as follows: 
• C(T i ) = E i = max 	i W . In particular C(T i ) is never empty. 
• S(T i ) = W 
The resulting partial plausibility ordering 	T is obtained by
erging the local preorders 	i and the epistemic state E resulting
rom the fusion is E = C(T )  = ∅ , such that 
• If C(T 1 ) ∩ C(T 2 ) = ∅ then C(T ) ⊆ C(T i ) , i = 1 , 2 (this is reﬂecting
A4); one may have that C(T ) ∩ (C(T 1 ) ∪ C(T 2 )) = ∅ . 
• If C(T ) ∩ C(T ′ )  = ∅ , where T and T ′ are the results of merging
the proﬁles E and E ′ , then C((E, E ′ )) = C(T ) ∩ C(T ′ ) (this is
reﬂecting A5 and A6) 
The authors prove that any fusion operation satisfying A1–A6
an be obtained by means of merging syncretic assignments asso-
iated to the sets E i and the result of the fusion is the core of the
btained global partial ordering 	T . 
Note that Axioms A5 and A6 are instrumental in proving the
xistence of syncretic assignments. These axioms (like those in the
GM theory of revision [2] ) are directly inspired by choice function
heory (see [16] for such a connexion) which deﬁnes axioms for
he selection of best items from subsets of options, such that there
xists a preference relation that can justify these choices. One may
rgue that the role of such axioms is more that of justifying a par-
icular representation of plausibility via orderings, than expressing
ey-properties of information fusion (A5 and A6 are also at work
s postulates 7 and 8 in the AGM axiomatic setting for revision). In
ny case, the merging of sets according to Koniecny and Pino-Perez
ses a richer framework than the one of sets. But the plausibility
rdering does not appear in the KP axioms. 
Since the knowledge merging in the KP style uses information
tems of the form (S(T i ) , C(T i ) , 	i ) = (W, E i , 	i ) , it is clear that the
ubset of possible worlds E i in the KP setting is then viewed as a
ost plausible set and no longer as a hard constraint. The absence
f any impossible world in the KP setting makes some of our ax-
oms of information fusion trivially satisﬁed under such inputs (for
nstance, Properties 1, 5). In order to account for this interpretation
f E i in our setting, we could revise some of our axioms as follows:
• Unanimity of Plausibility : 
• (a) 
⋂ n 
i =1 C(T i ) ⊆ C( f (T 1 , . . . , T n )) . 
• (b) C( f (T 1 , . . . , T n )) ⊆ C(T 1 ) ∪ · · · ∪ C(T n ) . 
• Strong Consistency Enforcement : C( f (T 1 , . . . , T n ))  = ∅ . 
• Fairness : ∀ i = 1 , . . . ,n, C( f (T 1 , . . . ,T n )) ∩ C(T i )  = ∅ . 
Interestingly, put in this form, these axioms no longer sound as
ompelling as their counterparts in terms of support. While part
a) of Unanimity is sanctioned by the KP axiom A2 and is hard to
hallenge, part (b) looks very demanding. Indeed, one may some-
imes ﬁnd it intuitively satisfactory if the most plausible worlds af-
er fusion do not lie in C(T 1 ) ∪ · · · ∪ C(T n ) (for instance if the most
lausible worlds for one source are all found to be very implau-
ible for another one, while there are worlds that are reasonably
lausible for all sources). As a consequence the above form of the
airness axiom also sounds too demanding. The Strong Consistency
nforcement is also endorsed by the KP framework (this is A1) but
t may look too strong if one would like to leave room for partial
nconsistency. 
However, it is clear that these postulates along with the ﬁve
ther ones would yield the MCS rule on plausible sets, which, in
he Boolean setting, may look less plausible than the MCS rule onard constraints. In particular, it rules out the kind of trade-off fu-
ion rules envisaged by Konieczny and Pino-Perez, where the core
f the result of the fusion may be disjoint from the cores of the
nputs. 
In order to lay bare concrete examples of merging rules, these
uthors appeal to numerical encodings of their syncretic assign-
ents, using a syntax-based Hamming distance between logical
nterpretations. In other words, they do not merge sets of mod-
ls, but fuzzy sets thereof, where the degrees of membership of
n interpretation w to a formula φi reﬂects the minimal Ham-
ing distance to a model of φi . This way of envisaging knowledge-
ased fusion is explained in more details by Benferhat et al. [7] ,
ho show it comes down to merging possibilistic logic bases (see
ection 6.3 ). 
The above discussion also lays bare the difference of perspec-
ives between the fusion of hard constraints and knowledge-base
erging: the idea of Konieczny and Pino-Perez is to explain the
usion of plain epistemic states, understood as a set of plausible
orlds, by the existence of underlying partial orderings or numer-
cal plausibility degrees (obtained by distances), based on axioms
hat only use plausible sets attached to these orderings. In [67] the
ame authors use both hard (integrity) constraints and belief sets
eferring to plausible worlds, and try to extend both the AGM revi-
ion and knowledge-based merging. However, they do not envisage
he merging of integrity constraints discussed in the previous sec-
ion. The belief revision and merging literature takes an external
oint of view on cognitive processes under study. The underlying
rdered structures are here a consequence of the merging postu-
ates, but they do not appear explicitly in the axioms and they are
ot observable from the outside. On the contrary, our approach is
o construct fusion rules that only rely on what is explicitly supplied
y sources. In the sequel we consider the counterpart of our fusion
ostulates for ranked models, that can be expressed by means of
otal orders of possible worlds or by their encodings on a plausi-
ility scale. 
. Merging of ranked epistemic states: ordinal setting 
In this section we study how to adapt the eight postulates of
nformation fusion to reﬁned epistemic states, whereby some pos-
ible worlds are more plausible than others. The various represen-
ations of likelihood where the whole information is contained in
he plausibility ordering over possible worlds can be captured un-
er the umbrella of possibility theory. In the purely ordinal case
omparative possibility was introduced by Lewis [72] and indepen-
ently by Dubois [31] . From the late 1980’s onward, ordinal plau-
ibility orderings are found in the theory of belief revision after
rove [58] , Gärdenfors [56] , Katsuno and Mendelzon [63] . In the
ater works, though, plausibility orderings are the result of the ax-
om systems adopted for belief revisions, and do not stand as prim-
tive explicit available data. 
.1. Ordinal representations 
In this subsection, we suppose information items T are ex-
licitly deﬁned by complete preorders 	T on W , following Lewis,
ubois and Grove. They should be understood as plausibility rank-
ngs on interpretations or states, and can be equivalently described
y well-ordered partitions P T = { A 1 , . . . , A k } such that 
 w i ∈ A i , w j ∈ A j , w i T w j ⇐⇒ i < j 
eans that w i is a more plausible world than w j . Internal consis-
ency of such information items can be interpreted by the acyclic-
ty of the strict relation T , which holds if we start with complete
reorders. This is a strong form of internal consistency. 
24 D. Dubois et al. / Information Fusion 32 (2016) 12–39 
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e  Let us denote by R T the subset of W × W corresponding to 	T .
In contrast to strong internal consistency, strong internal inconsis-
tency would correspond to R T = ∅ (all pairs (w 1 , w 2 ) consist of in-
comparable states), which is made impossible by assuming com-
plete preorders. The conventions coming from knowledge-based
fusion deﬁne the core C(T ) as max 	T W irrespective of how much
plausible are the most plausible worlds. The support is the whole
set of states, none of which is assumed to be impossible. 
As seen above, the KP knowledge-based merging approach un-
derlies plausibility orderings 	i that are not explicitly used in the
postulates, but whose existence is a consequence of them. Here,
we assume these are explicitly handled as complete preorders (or
rankings). KP axioms only bear on the plausible sets E i = C(T i ) in-
duced by abstract information items. It comes down to a kind of
renormalisation, bringing the most plausible worlds for each 	i at
the same plausibility level to make them minimally commensurate.
These plausible sets are considered to be the “visible part” of the
information items. 
For instance, in the KP approach, the information ordering
T 1  T 2 between information items is expressed by inclusion be-
tween plausible sets C 1 (T ) ⊆ C 2 (T ) , irrespective of the actual un-
derlying rankings. One may think of more demanding notions of
entailment between possibility rankings. Here are two of them [9] :
• Reﬁnement ordering: 	1 	2 if and only if P 1 reﬁnes P 2 ; 
• Speciﬁcity ordering [50,88] , letting k and  be the number of el-
ements of the partitions induced by 	1 and 	2 respectively: 
	1  s 	2 if and only if ∀ i = 1 , . . . , min (k,  ) , ⋃ j=1 ... i A 1 j ⊆⋃ 
j=1 ... i A 2 j 
The reﬁnement ordering introduces a natural mapping between
elements of the well-ordered partitions associated to ordinal infor-
mation items, as the equivalence classes of the coarser partition
are unions of elements of the ﬁner one. 
The speciﬁcity ordering (put forward by Pearl [88] as favour-
ing the most compact ranking) is weaker than reﬁnement but it
introduces a systematic commensurateness assumption between
the weak order relations, whereby A 1 
j 
is mapped to A 2 
j 
, for j =
1 , . . . , min (k,  ) , namely it presupposes that in each pair (A 1 
j 
, A 2 
j 
)
the sets are equally likely. However, there exists a dual notion pre-
supposing that A 1 
k 
and A 2  are equally unlikely, and A 
1 
k − j and A 
2 
 − j 
as well, for j = 1 , . . . , min (k,  ) − 1 . The choice between these two
ordering comparison methods may look sowewhat arbitrary. So, in
the purely ordinal setting, the reﬁnement ordering looks like the
least controversial as not involving commensurateness. Neverthe-
less the speciﬁcity ordering is used in ordinal approaches to non-
monotonic reasoning like Pearl’s system Z [88] , or the semantic ac-
count of preferential inference in terms of linear possibility distri-
butions [9] , as it ﬁts the natural informational ordering of possibil-
ity theory [50] . 
Likewise, in the KP setting, two information items T 1 and T 2 are
said to be consistent if C(T 1 ) ∩ C(T 2 )  = ∅ . In contrast, a much more
demanding form of consistency between rankings, that does not
involve a commensurateness assumption, is as follows: 
	1 is strongly consistent with 	2 if and only if  w 1 , w 2 , w 1 1 
w 2 , w 2 2 w 1 . 
It means that there is no preference reversals between T 1 and
T 2 (this is often called comonotonicity). At the opposite, a very
weak consistency requirement can be expressed by the existence
of at least one pair of possible worlds for which the two sources
agree: 
	1 is weakly consistent with 	2 if and only if ∃ w 1 , w 2 , w 1 	1 
w 2 , w 1 	2 w 2 . 
It is weaker than the consistency condition in the KP set-
ting, since the latter is weak consistency enforced to w 1 ∈ C(T 1 ) ∩
C(T 2 ) . In voting theory, well-known axioms have been proposed
or aggregating complete preorderings into complete preorder-
ngs. Some have been already mentioned in the previous sec-
ion: universality (UNI), local ordinal unanimity (LOU) and inde-
endence of irrelevant alternatives (IIR). Of course, together with
on-dictatorship they lead to the celebrated Arrow’s impossibility
heorem from voting theory [3] , saying that dictatorship is then
he only possible fusion rule, namely the result of merging sev-
ral complete preorders is necessarily one of them. Lehmann and
aynard-Reid [79] try to bypass the impossibility result by re-
axing the complete preordering representation. They use modu-
ar relations, where transitivity is changed into modularity: if w 	
 
′ then w 	 z or z 	 w ′ . Such relations also lead to well-ordered
artitions, but they are no longer acyclic, and allow circuits in-
ide equivalence classes. In the case of sources treated on a par,
ehmann and Maynard-Reid propose as the basic rational fusion
ule the set theoretic union of the strict part of (modular) relations
i . The obtained relation is modular but not necessarily transitive. 
However, it is not clear why we should adopt the axioms of
oting theory for information fusion. Clearly, voting theory uses no
oncept of information ordering, nor any form of minimal commit-
ent. The IIR property is not always satisﬁed by the fusion rules
n the set-based case (e.g., when sources are inconsistent), as clear
rom the role of MCS fusion rule in the previous section. However,
t sounds natural to rely on plausibility orderings for representing
nformation items and to share some axioms with voting theory.
or instance, as seen earlier, Universality is a consequence of our
ramework. 
.2. The basic postulates for the fusion of plausibility orderings 
So, let us try to instantiate the eight postulates on the fusion
f complete preorders 	i , i = 1 , n . The use of complete preorders
orresponds to the idea that input items of information should be
trongly internally consistent. We denote by ∼ i the equivalence
elation associated with 	i (that is, w 1 ∼i w 2 ⇐⇒ w 1 	i w 2 and
 2 	i w 1 ). In order to protect the approach against Arrow’s impos-
ibility theorem, we shall assume the result of the fusion need not
e a complete preorder: some states may be incomparable in the
nal result (denoted by w 1 i w 2 ). This is the price paid for not
aking any commensurateness assumption. In this setting our ax-
oms can take the following form: 
1. Local ordinal unanimity. As deﬁned earlier: If ∀ i, w 	i w ′ , then
w 	 w ′ . 
2. Information monotonicity. If 	1 
i 
reﬁnes 	2 
i 
, ∀ i = 1 , n then the re-
sult of aggregating 	1 
i 
should reﬁne the result of aggregating
	2 
i 
, if the relations 	1 
i 
are strongly mutually consistent. 
3. Consistency enforcement. The result must be at least weakly con-
sistent. 
4. Optimism. If w 1 i w 2 for one source i , then w 1  w 2 if w 2  j 
w 1 for no other source j . 
5. Fairness. If after fusion w 2 	 w 1 , then ∃ i : w 2 	i w 1 . 
6. Insensitivity to vacuous information. If R i = W ×W then source i
does not inﬂuence the result of the fusion. 
7. Commutativity. 
8. Minimal commitment. The obtained plausibility relation should
be the least reﬁned among those that satisfy the above postu-
lates. 
Regarding the unanimity postulate, it seems that it is very nat-
ral to conclude that w is more plausible than w ′ if all sources
ay so, and likewise for equally plausible. Note that this is true re-
ardless of other alternatives. Property 3 copes with the impossi-
ility theorem of Arrow to some extent by allowing some incom-
arabilities to take place in the resulting plausibility relation. How-
ver, in the case of two sources providing opposite linear rankings
D. Dubois et al. / Information Fusion 32 (2016) 12–39 25 
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 f states, all options are incomparable, and there is no aggrega-
ion method obeying the 8 postulates. The above form of the op-
imism postulate tries to exploit all reasons to consider one state
ore plausible than another. The fairness property as formulated
ere is minimally demanding: the ﬁnal comparability between any
wo states w 1 and w 2 corresponds to the opinion of at least one
ource. Property 6 is not acceptable in the scope of voting theory
nd Property 8 makes no sense in that setting. 
The fusion rule enforced by all required properties but Prop-
rty 3 can be summarised by the following procedure for each pair
(w 1 , w 2 ) . 
• If ∀ i, w 1 	i w 2 , and  j, w 1 i w 2 , then w 1 	 w 2 (unanimity). 
• If ∀ i, w 1 	i w 2 , and ∃ j, w 1  j w 2 , then w 1  w 2 (optimism). 
• Otherwise w 1  w 2 (incomparability). 
This fusion rule is just the Pareto vector ordering (PAR) applied
o all n complete preorders. It is easy to check that other postulates
re satisﬁed. Information monotonicity holds because making one
reference relation coarser will not create any inconsistency with
ther ones if the more reﬁned relation was strongly consistent
ith the other ones. Fairness hold as at worst ∀ i, ∃ w 1 , w 2 such that
 1 and w 2 will be incomparable, hence not contradicting w 1 i w 2 .
nsensivity to vacuous information is here insensivity to full indif-
erence, that cannot affect unanimity and optimism. Minimal com-
itment is due to the fact that this fusion rule does not solve
utright conﬂicts and proposes incomparability in this case. Note
hat the resulting relation may be very partial but it is transitive.
n the case where the sources are not even globally weakly con-
istent, that is  w 1 , w 2 , ∀ i, w 1 	i w 2 , then w 1  w 2 , ∀ w 1 , w 2 ∈ W,
hich contradicts Property 3. 
Other combination rules for partial orders exist in the literature.
or instance 
• Lehmann and Maynard-Reid [79] suggest to compute the union
of the strict parts of 	i : in terms of combining subsets of W ×
W , the strict part MR of the result reads 
R MR = 
n ⋃ 
i =1 
(R i ∩ (R −1 i ) c ) , 
where (w 1 , w 2 ) ∈ R −1 i if and only if w 2 	i w 1 , and R i ∩ (R −1 i ) c 
represents the strict part of 	i . 
• The likely dominance rule [33] : 
w 1 LD w 2 ⇐⇒ [ w 1 > w 2 ] > ι [ w 2 > w 1 ] ;
w 1 ∼LD w 2 ⇐⇒ [ w 1 ≥ w 2 ] = ι [ w 2 ≥ w 1 ] , 
where [ w 1 > w 2 ] = { i : w 1 i w 2 } , and ≥ ι is a partial preorder-
ing on subsets I , J of sources, representing their relative relia-
bility. 
Lehmann and Maynard-Reid [79] propose their fusion rule for
erging epistemic states represented by transitive and modular re-
ations. This is a looser framework than complete preorderings. The
trict part of such relations still rank-orders a partition. Elements
f a partition may be either mutually indifferent or conﬂicting. The
esult of the fusion may fail to be transitive and the authors sug-
est to compute its transitive closure. The likely dominance rule
s the one that remains in decision under non-commensurate un-
ertainty and utility, when the ﬁrst ﬁve Savage axioms of decision
heory (see [51] Chapter 9) are preserved, but for the completeness
nd transitivity of the preference over acts. 
We can show the following result: 
roposition 7. When merging complete preorderings, the Pareto fu-
ion rule is equivalent to the intersection 
⋂ n 
i =1 R i of 	i . Moreover, its
trict part is equivalent to 
1. The union of the strict parts of 	i : R PAR = ( 
⋃ n 
i =1 R i ∩ (R −1 i ) c ) c 
2. The likely dominance rule when groups of sources have the same
reliability: I > ι J if and only if I  = ∅ = J, and I = ι J otherwise. [  Proof . Suppose w 1 	PAR w 2 by the Pareto fusion rule. It is equiv-
lent to w 1 	i w 2 , ∀ i . It is equivalent to (w 1 , w 2 ) ∈ ⋂ n i =1 R i . Now
 1 PAR w 2 , if, moreover, there is some source i with w 1 i w 2 ,
hich corresponds to the disjunction of strict parts of 	i . The
ase of incomparability w 1 PAR w 2 corresponds to when w 1 i 
 2 and w 2  j w 1 for some i, j, w 1 , w 2 , whereby both w 1 MR w 2 
nd w 2 MR w 1 hold. For the third property, note that under the
roposed assumptions, w 1 LD w 2 ⇐⇒ [ w 2 > w 1 ] = ∅ and [ w 1 >
 2 ]  = ∅ ; It means w 1 i w 2 for some i and w 1 	 j w 2 for j  = i . This
s w 1 PAR w 2 . 
In the case where the obtained relation is strongly inconsistent,
ne way to escape the trival result of a strongly inconsistent re-
ult is to attach priorities to sources, as done by Maynard-Reid and
hoham [80] . The likely dominance rule does the same by attach-
ng priorities to groups of sources, but the resulting relation may
nclude cycles [33] . Alternatively, we may resort to a counterpart
f a MCS fusion rule. It consists of the following steps 
• Find all the maximal subsets of weakly consistent sources
for the Pareto fusion rule (i.e., maximal subsets I k such that
R PAR ({	i : i ∈ I k } )  = ∅ ). 
• MCS(	1 , . . . , 	n ) = 
⋃ 
k R PAR ({	i : i ∈ I k } ) 
This technique could avoid violating Property 3, but may not
ield a transitive relation any longer. 
In summary, the issue of merging epistemic states represented
y plausibility relations on states of affairs has received only lit-
le attention, compared to the same problem where the relations
epresent preferences of individuals in a group. Preliminary results
uggest that one cannot just apply results from voting theory to
he setting of belief merging, as the working assumptions in both
reas seem to differ, even if they overlap. There may be speciﬁc
pproaches to belief merging likely to circumvent impossibility re-
ults inherited from the voting area, that may be of interest only
or belief merging. 
In particular, one may replace the notion of reﬁnement be-
ween ordinal epistemic states with the speciﬁcity ordering. How-
ver, as discussed earlier, it comes down to restoring commensu-
ateness between sources that is absent from the purely ordinal
iew. The speciﬁcity-based approach is more naturally addressed
n the framework of possibility theory, using a common scale for
ources of information. 
. Merging in possibility theory 
Possibility theory is one of the main theories for reasoning un-
er uncertainty due to incomplete information [44] . It is a ﬂexi-
le framework for merging information because set-based fusion
odes can be directly extended to fuzzy sets representing items of
ncomplete information in a gradual way. An extensive overview of
usion methods in possibility theory appears in [52] . 
Possibility theory has several variants [50] , some being qualita-
ive (ordinal, as in the previous subsection, or classiﬁcatory), some
eing numerical such as the theory of kappa functions by Spohn
104,106] . Instead of using a purely relative notion of plausibility,
t may be convenient to use a plausibility scale L , in the form of a
ounded totally ordered set. The primary concept in scaled pos-
ibility theory is the possibility distribution π on W , a mapping
ith domain W taking values on L . It rank-orders interpretations in
erms of plausibility ( w 	T w ′ if π(w ) ≥ π(w ′ ) , albeit using abso-
ute ratings). Moreover, it also enables landmark possibility values
o be deﬁned: the bottom 0 of L refers to complete impossibility
hile 1 refers to full plausibility (no impediment to the realisation
f an event). In particular, the normalisation condition for possibil-
ty distributions is that π(w ) = 1 for some w ∈ W . 
Pioneers of possibility theory are the English economist Shackle
96] who interpreted plausibility in terms of lack of surprise, the
26 D. Dubois et al. / Information Fusion 32 (2016) 12–39 
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s  philosopher Lewis [72] , who introduced comparative possibility re-
lations in order to provide a semantics to his logic of counterfactu-
als, and the professor of electrical engineering Zadeh [118] , who re-
lated degrees of possibility and membership functions of fuzzy sets
in the setting of natural language understanding, for the purpose of
modelling the extension of gradual predicates. More recently, nu-
merical degrees of possibility were understood as upper bounds
of probability degrees [48] . Independently, Spohn [104] introduced
an integer-valued theory of plausibility, where higher integers re-
ﬂect more implausible situations and are viewed as exponents of
inﬁnitesimal probabilities [105] . 
6.1. Plausibility scales 
All representations of epistemic states by possibility distribu-
tions do not have the same expressive power since the plausibil-
ity scale can be numerical or not. In fact we can distinguish be-
tween several representation settings according to the expressive-
ness of the scale used. There are four kinds of scales one may en-
visage in increasing order of expressiveness: qualitative (ﬁnite or
not), integer-valued, or real-valued [10] . 
1. The qualitative ﬁnite or classiﬁcatory setting (QUALFI for short)
with possibility degrees lying in a ﬁnite totally ordered scale:
L = { α0 = 1 > α1 > · · · > αm −1 > αm = 0 } . This setting is used in
possibilistic logic [36] . The values αi can be viewed as just de-
noting ranked class names, from the class fully plausible ( α0 ) to
the class impossible . 
2. The dense ordinal setting (DORD for short) using L = [0 , 1] ,
seen as an ordinal scale. In this case, the possibility distribu-
tion π is deﬁned up to any monotone increasing transformation
f : [0 , 1] → [0 , 1] , f (0) = 0 , f (1) = 1 . This setting is also used
in possibilistic logic [36] . 
3. The denumerable setting (DENUM for short), using a scale
made of successive powers L = { α0 = 1 > α1 > · · · > αi > · · ·0 } ,
for some α ∈ (0, 1) 9 . This scale is quite expressive as it is
equipped with semi-group operations min , max , product, and
also division. This is isomorphic to the use of integers in so-
called κ-functions by Spohn [104] . It is used in belief merging
by Chopra et al. [22] . 
4. The dense absolute setting (DABS for short) where L = [0 , 1] ,
seen as a genuine numerical scale equipped with product. In
this case, a possibility measure can be viewed as special case
of a Shafer [97] plausibility function, actually a consonant plau-
sibility function, and 1 − π a potential surprise function in the
sense of Shackle [96] . 
The possibility theory framework is a graded extension of
the set-theoretic setting. An item of information T expressed in
the form of a possibility distribution π has support S(π ) = { w :
π(w ) > 0 } and core C(π ) = { w : π(w ) = 1 } (which is not empty
as long as the possibility distribution is normalised), and naturally
deﬁnes a plausibility ordering on W . The information ordering be-
tween possibility distributions is relative speciﬁcity ( π i  π j ⇔ π i 
≤ π j ), which differs from the reﬁnement ordering in the previous
section for comparative possibilities. This is a major difference with
the ordinal setting, as here possibility distributions are commensu-
rate. 
Like sets, uncertain inputs represented by possibility distribu-
tions can be combined by means of aggregation operators in two
main modes: conjunctive or disjunctive [49] with the same ratio-
nale on the assumed reliability of sources. According to the nature
of the plausibility scale, basic operations that are instrumental for
fusion may differ. Conjunctions and disjunctions are deﬁned as fol-
lows: 9 As usual αi stands for the i th power of α. 
p  
t  
c  eﬁnition 1. A conjunction on L is a binary mapping ∗: L × L → L
uch that 
1. If x ≤ y then x ∗z ≤ y ∗z ; 
2. If x ≤ y then z ∗x ≤ z ∗y ; 
3. 0 ∗ 0 = 0 ∗ 1 = 1 ∗ 0 = 0 and 1 ∗ 1 = 1 ; 
4. ∗ is commutative. 
It is a monotonic binary operation that coincides with a Boolean
onjunction. A disjunction operation ⊕ is deﬁned likewise replac-
ng the third condition by 0 ⊕ 0 = 0 ;0 ⊕ 1 = 1 ⊕ 0 = 1 ⊕ 1 = 1 . As
reviously, conjunctive operators are instrumental to combine (es-
ecially strongly) consistent inputs while disjunctive operators are
seful for the combination of inconsistent uncertain inputs. 
In the QUALFI setting the most usual conjunctions and dis-
unctions are min and max . They satisfy the De Morgan laws
ith respect to the negation operation ν(αi ) = αm −i . They are as-
ociative. Due to the qualitative nature of this scale we restrict
o such connectives. The DORD setting only allows for such con-
ectives as well. Operations min and max are also exchanged
ia any decreasing and involutive mapping ν: [0, 1] → [0, 1] as
( max (ν(α) , ν(β)) = min (α, β) . 
In the DASB settings the most usual conjunctions and disjunc-
ions are respectively continuous triangular norms (t-norms, for
hort) and co-norms [65] . They are fuzzy set connectives that ex-
end the intersection and the union of sets. On top of min and
ax , examples of associative conjunctive operators include, prod-
ct ( α · β) and linear product ( max (0 , α + β − 1) ) and examples of
isjunctive operators, are the probabilistic sum ( α + β − α · β) and
he bounded sum ( min (1 , α + β) ), where α and β stand for possi-
ility degrees for state w according to two agents. These additional
perations do not make sense on classiﬁcatory or ordinal scales. 
While conjunctions min and product belong to the DENUM set-
ing, some operations are not deﬁnable. For instance, there is no
rder-reversing map on the set of integers, hence we cannot de-
ne a non-idempotent disjunction associated to the probabilistic
um of terms of the form αi , αj , that is a non-idempotent dual to
he sum i + j of integers, while min ( i , j ) and max ( i , j ) make sense.
Non-idempotent conjunctions make sense if we can assume in-
ependence between coherent sources, which justiﬁes a property
uch as π1 ∗∗πn < π i for the conjunction of information items,
xpressing a reinforcement effect toward impossibility. On the con-
rary, if the dependence between sources is unknown, the use of
dempotent connectives (min and max ) looks appropriate [49] .
t could lead to an additional postulate that would make sense
n numerical plausibility scales introducing an assumption about
ource independence that is absent from the basic postulates. 
emark 1. The scale classiﬁcation at the beginning of this subsec-
ion stands in contrast with the one usual in measurement the-
ry [76] , distinguishing between ordinal scales (DORD), ratio scales
the positive real line up to a positive multiplicative factor), and
nterval scales (the real line up to a positive aﬃne transforma-
ion). The two latter scales are generally not used for represent-
ng degrees of uncertainty (more usually for degrees of utility).
evertheless, let us mention Ma and Liu [77] who use represen-
ations of epistemic states as a mapping ρ : W → Z , the set of rel-
tive integers (including ± ∞ ) that is insensitive to integer trans-
ations (for any constant k , ρ and ρ + k represent the same in-
ormation item). The degree ρ(w ) represents a degree of rela-
ive plausibility of w with the understanding that only the differ-
nce ρ(w ) − ρ(w ′ ) reﬂects the extent to which w is more plau-
ible than w ′ , while ρ(w ) gives no clue on the absolute plau-
ibility strength. In such a setting, the natural fusion rule is the
ointwise addition ρ + ρ′ , that preserves the equivalence of rela-
ive plausibility functions up to an additive constant. However, we
annot use max nor min that fail to preserve it. One can construct
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t   Spohn ordinal conditional function from a relative plausibility
unction ρ as: κρ(w ) = max w ′ ∈ W ρ(w ′ ) − ρ(w ) . It can be checked
hat κρ+ ρ′ = κρ + κρ′ −min w ′ ∈ W (κρ (w ′ ) + κρ′ (w ′ )) , the combina-
ion rule for kappa functions [71] . 
.2. Rational fusion rules on plausibility scales 
We denote by πi (w ) the degree of plausibility of alternative w
ccording to source i , and consider the problem of merging n pos-
ibility distributions π i . The consistency degree between two pos-
ibility distributions is Cns ∗(πi , π j ) = max w πi (w ) ∗ π j (w ) , where ∗
s a conjunctive operation. It ranges from 1 when there is a com-
on w that is fully possible, to 0 when the supports do not over-
ap. It depends on the choice of the conjunction. If the conjunction
s associative, its extension Cns ∗(π1 , . . . , πn ) to n sources is obvious
nd is 1 (resp., > 0) if all cores (resp. supports) of the π i ’s overlap.
The basic properties make sense as they stand, using the core,
he support and the plausibility ordering induced by π i , and in-
erpreting minimal commitment as a maximisation of possibility
egrees. One may nevertheless provide a more specialised version
f some postulates: 
1. Unanimity 
• Possibility preservation π1 ∗ . . . ∗ πn ≤ f (π1 , . . . , πn ) for some
conjunction operation ∗ such that a > 0, b > 0 implies a ∗b
> 0. 
• Impossibility preservation S( f (π1 , . . . , πn )) ⊆
⋃ n 
i =1 S(πi ) . 
2. Information monotonicity. If Cns ∗(π1 , . . . , πn )  = 0 and πi ≤
π ′ 
i 
, ∀ i = 1 , . . . , n then f (π1 , . . . , πn ) ≤ f (π ′ 1 , . . . , π ′ n ) . 
3. Consistency enforcement. The result must not be strongly incon-
sistent, i.e., S( f (π1 , . . . , πn ))  = ∅ . 
4. Optimism. If Cns ∗(π1 , . . . , πn ) = 1 then π1 ∗ . . . ∗ πn ≥
f (π1 , . . . , πn ) , and max (π1 , . . . , πn ) ≥ f (π1 , . . . , πn ) other-
wise. 
5. Insensitivity to Vacuous Information. f (π1 , . . . , πn −1 , π? ) =
f (π1 , . . . , πn −1 ) , where π? (w ) = 1 ∀ w ∈ W . 
6. Commutativity. 
7. Minimal commitment. The obtained possibility distribution
should be the least speciﬁc among those that satisfy the above
postulates. 
Let us examine the properties of conjunctive combination rules.
t is fairly easy to prove using conjunction min : 
roposition 8. If Cns min (π1 , . . . , πn ) > 0 , the minimum rule πmin =
in (π1 , . . . , πn ) satisﬁes all basic properties of information fusion. 
However, the minimum rule does not satisfy Consistency En-
orcement in case supports of the possibility distributions do not
verlap (the result is the empty set). It is then not fair either, as
he result in case of strong inconsistency between sources, leaves
o trace of them. Replacing the minimum by an Archimedean con-
inuous t-norm ( t ( α, α) < α if 0 < α < 1) such as product yields
 connective that satisﬁes the same properties, but minimal com-
itment is in some sense supplemented by an independence as-
umption justifying a reinforcement effect making a state less pos-
ible than the minimal possibility degree granted by sources to this
tate. Note that the linear product t-norm is excluded from further
onsideration as it violates possibility preservation. In fact, it can
e useful if the possibility of lying untruthful sources exists [85] . 
To get rid of the diﬃculty with Consistency Enforcement, one
ssumption that is often implicitly made is the “No Impossible
orld” assumption, here ∀ w ∈ W, ∀ i = 1 , . . . , n : πi (w ) > 0 , which
hen lead some authors to accept conjunctive rules as the only ra-
ional merging rules. The strong form of the Consistency Enforce-
ent postulate says that if there is some common ground between
ources with a non-zero possibility degree, it should include theruth, also a strong form of optimism. Trying to satisfy this prop-
rty justiﬁes a renormalised conjunctive operation of the form,
 w ∈ W : 
ˆ (π1 , . . . , πn )(w ) = Cns ∗(π1 , . . . , πn ) → ∗ (π1 (w ) ∗ . . . ∗ πn (w )) 
here α → ∗ β = sup { γ : α ∗ γ ≤ β} is the residual operator of ∗
65] , which yields 1 if α ≤ β . Two instances of this rule, respec-
ively in the QUALFI or DORD settings and in the numerical ones
ere already proposed in [45] : 
ˆ in (π1 , . . . , πn )(w ) 
= 
{
min 
n 
i =1 πi (w ) if less than Cns min (π1 , . . . , πn ) 
1 otherwise; 
(5) 
ˆ prod (π1 , . . . , πn )(w ) = π1 (w ) · · · · · πn (w ) 
max v ∈ W π1 (v ) · · · · · πn (v ) 
(6) 
The rule (5) violates Impossibility Preservation (Unanimity 1b)
n the situation of disjoint supports, since everything becomes pos-
ible in this case. The second part of the optimism axiom may be
iolated as well due to the renormalisation factor which may make
 state w fully plausible even if no source is proposing it with full
ossibility. Moreover, the rule (5) loses the associativity of the min-
mum rule, while its variant (6) with product instead of minimum
reserves associativity [45] . However, the latter rule makes sense
nly as long as 
⋂ n 
i =1 S(πi )  = 0 . If this condition is not met, the
ule again violates Consistency Enforcement, because it then is not
eﬁned mathematically. Note that this combination rule is exactly
he one recently proposed by Laverny and Lang [71] on positive
ntegers: 
⊕ κ ′ = κ + κ ′ − min 
w ′ ∈ W 
(κ(w ′ ) + κ ′ (w ′ )) , 
n order to combine ranking functions of Spohn, once the latter
s mapped back to the unit interval (DENUM setting) via a suit-
ble transformation. Ma and Liu [77] propose postulates to jus-
ify this combination rule in terms of addition of relative plausi-
ility functions ρ recalled in Remark 1 . These postulates partially
eﬂect some basic properties advocated here, but there is no full-
edged information comparison ordering between relative plausi-
ility functions that are deﬁned in terms of integer-valued func-
ions invariant with respect to a translation (but for comparing the
ores). Moreover, the use of addition or product presupposes a re-
nforcement effect that makes sense only if sources can be consid-
red independent, and that can only be expressed in a numerical
etting. 
Then, in order to recover all our basic postulates in the possi-
ilistic setting, one is led to use disjunctive combination rules and
xtend the MCS rule (4) from sets to fuzzy sets. We can do it in at
east two ways: 
CS-1 (π1 , . . . , πn ) = max 
I∈ MCS({C(π1 ) , ... , C(πn ) } ) 
∗i ∈ I πi (7) 
CS-0 (π1 , . . . , πn ) = max 
I∈ MCS({S(π1 ) , ... , S(πn ) } ) 
∗i ∈ I πi (8) 
In fact each of MCS-1, MCS-0 selects maximal consistent sub-
ets in a speciﬁc way, checking consistency on cores or supports
espectively. Rule MCS-0 may yield a subnormalised but not empty
esult. Once, this principle chosen, the same reasoning holds as in
he crisp case, and we obtain expected properties for these two
usion rules: 
roposition 9. For ∗ = min , the extended-MCS rules ( 7 ) and ( 8 ) sat-
sfy all basic fusion properties. 
Proof . It is clear that these fusion rules coincide with the mini-
um rule if Cns min (π1 , . . . , πn ) = 1 . Moreover, if all input distribu-
ions have disjoint supports then both rules yield the maximum of
28 D. Dubois et al. / Information Fusion 32 (2016) 12–39 
Table 2 
Possibilistic fusion rules on 3-level plausibility scales. 
Rules C 1 ∩ C 2  = ∅ C 1 ∩ C 2 = ∅ , S 1 ∩ S 2  = ∅ S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅ 
min ( C 1 ∩ C 2 , S 1 ∩ S 2 ) ( ∅ , S 1 ∩ S 2 ) ( ∅ , ∅ ) 
ˆ min ( C 1 ∩ C 2 , S 1 ∩ S 2 ) ( S 1 ∩ S 2 , S 1 ∩ S 2 ) ( W , W ) 
MCS-1 ( C 1 ∩ C 2 , S 1 ∩ S 2 ) ( C 1 ∪ C 2 , S 1 ∪ S 2 ) ( C 1 ∪ C 2 , S 1 ∪ S 2 ) 
MCS-0 ( C 1 ∩ C 2 , S 1 ∩ S 2 ) ( ∅ , S 1 ∩ S 2 ) ( C 1 ∪ C 2 , S 1 ∪ S 2 ) 
MCS-cuts ( C 1 ∩ C 2 , S 1 ∩ S 2 ) ( C 1 ∪ C 2 , S 1 ∩ S 2 ) ( C 1 ∪ C 2 , S 1 ∪ S 2 ) 
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f  all possibility distributions. So 
min (π1 , . . . , πn ) ≤ MCS- i (π1 , . . . , πn ) ≤ max (π1 , . . . , πn ) , i = 0 , 1
and Unanimity postulate clearly holds (these rules are idempo-
tent moreover). Informational Monotony, Consistency Enforcement
(strong for MCS-1), Insensitivity to Vacuous Information and Com-
mutativity are obvious. These rules satisfy Fairness, since when
ns min (π1 , . . . , πn ) < 1 , ∀ i, ∃ w ∈ C(πi ) , MCS- 1(π1 , . . . , πn )(w ) = 1
and ∀ i, ∃ w ∈ S(πi ) , MCS- 0(π1 , . . . , πn )(w ) > 0 . Optimism holds for
MCS-1 in the sense that for maximal subgroups I of strongly con-
sistent sources a conjunctive rule is applied and the use of the
minimum operation corresponds to Minimal Commitment inside
this group. Similarly, optimism also holds for MCS-0 considering
consistent sources. Minimal Commitment also prevents us from
choosing between the maximal strongly consistent subsets. 
MCS-1 is much demanding on mutual consistency of sources
and already yields plain disjunction if cores of π i are dis-
joint. MCS-0 is less demanding and more optimistic: it yields
min (π1 , . . . , πn ) if all supports overlap, but one may renormalise
the resulting distribution. The same results hold if min is re-
placed by product, with the same proviso as before regarding min-
imal commitment. Note that there are more such rational fusion
rules as we could use α-cuts {A α(πi ) = { w : πi (w ) ≥ α} to com-
pute maximal consistent subsets: 
MCS- α(π1 , . . . , πn ) = max 
I∈ MCS({A α (π1 ) , ... , A α (πn ) } ) 
∗i ∈ I πi . 
All fusion rules MCS- α, α ∈ L {0} can be deﬁned, and become
more demanding as α increases. 
Another fusion rule for possibility distributions called MCS-cuts
applies the classical MCS rule to all cuts of the input possibility
distributions has been recently proposed [30] . Its result T is de-
ﬁned by the family of sets T α , α ∈ L {1} obtained by applying (4)
to {A α(π1 ) , . . . , A α(πn ) } . 
T α = 
⋃ 
I∈ MCS(A α (π1 ) , ... , A α (πn )) 
⋂ 
i ∈ I 
A α(πi ) (9)
It obviously satisﬁes all basic postulates but the sets T α , α ∈
L {1} are in general no longer nested, which calls for an enlarged
representation framework. Note that one may even have that T αi ∩
T α j = ∅ for i  = j . In the numerical settings DABS and DENUM, it
yields a belief function, with mass function such that m T (T αi ) =
αi − αi +1 , i = 0 , . . . , m − 1 . 
To illustrate these fusion rules we can consider the simplest
qualitative plausibility scale L = { 1 > α > 0 } . This is when an in-
formation item is completely deﬁned by non-empty supports and
cores: T = (C T ⊆ S T ) deﬁning an ordered partition P T = (C T , S T \
 T , W \ S T ) . The results of applying the above rules for two sources
yielding (C i , S i ) , i = 1 , 2 are pictured on Table 2 : 
It can be checked that 
• all fusion rules coincide if cores intersect; 
• the min rule violates Consistency Enforcement and Fairness
when S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅ ; 
• in the same situation, the normalised ˆ min rule violates Impos-
sibility Preservation, Optimism and Fairness; • MCS-1 coincides with the max rule when cores are disjoint and
is less optimistic than MCS-0; 
• MCS-0 mends the min rule as it restores (weak) Consistency
Enforcement and Fairness when the latter fails them; 
• the MCS-cuts rule does not yield nested subsets, and espe-
cially we may have (middle column) (C 1 ∪ C 2 ) ∩ (S 1 ∩ S 2 ) = ∅ if
it turns out that C 1 ∩ S 2 = S 1 ∩ C 2 = ∅ . 
emark 2. In [87] , the following properties were proposed w.r.t a
usion operator ◦π applied to a set of possibility distributions π i : 
O1 : π-Commutativity and π-associativity. 
O2 : π-Idempotence. 
O3 : π-Monotony. Given two sets { π1 , . . . , πn } and { π ′ 1 , . . . , π ′ n }
of possibility distributions such that ∀ i, ∀ w, πi (w ) ≥ π ′ i (w ) ,
then ◦π (π1 , . . . , πn ) ≥ ◦π (π ′ 1 , . . . , π ′ n ) . 
O4 : π-impossible case and π-complete ignorance case. 
Let π∅ ( π∅ (w ) = 0 , ∀ w ∈ W ) and πW ( πW (w ) = 1 , ∀ w ∈ W )
be possibility distributions that stand for complete contradic-
tion and vacuous information respectively, and then 
1. ◦π (π1 , . . . , πn , π∅ ) = ◦π (π1 , . . . , πn ) 
2. ◦π (π1 , . . . , πn , πW ) = ◦π (π1 , . . . , πn ) . 
ur axiomatic framework does not consider associativity (O1) nor
dempotence (O2) as imperative requirements, nor does it assume
he possibility of inconsistent inputs (ﬁrst part of O4). We also re-
trict axiom O3 (our property 2) to strongly consistent inputs. Up
o these points, the above axioms do ﬁt ours (O4-2 is our property
: insensitivity to vacuous information). 
There are two axioms related to O4, adapted from the proba-
ilistic setting [24] : 
(a) zero preservation: If ∃ w ∈ W, ∀ i, πi (w ) = 0 , then ◦π (π1 , . . . ,
n )(w ) = 0 . 
(b) maximal plausibility: If ∃ w ∈ W, ∀ i, πi (w ) > 0 , then ◦π (π1 ,
 . . , πn )(w ) > 0 . 
These properties correspond to our postulate 1. 
emark 3. Quota merging rules can apply to possibility distribu-
ions [52] . In this case one can consider the maximal number k ∗
f strongly consistent sources (cores intersecting), and the maxi-
al number k ∗ > k ∗ of weakly consistent sources (supports inter-
ecting), performing the conjunction of pieces of information from
he former group, and the renormalised conjunction of pieces of
nformation from the latter group. These two resulting informa-
ion items can be further merged, in a prioritised way, giving more
eight to the set of strongly consistent sources. 
emark 4. Chopra et al [22] also propose seven postulates for in-
ormation fusion in the DENUM setting. We brieﬂy restore them in
ur setting. Their axiom 0 corresponds to an optimistic form of
mpossibility preservation (even though no state is considered im-
ossible in [22] ), which would read π(w ) ≤ max n 
i =1 πi (w ) in our
etting. Axiom 1 is a truth-functionality axiom, akin to Inde-
endence of Irrelevant Alternatives, saying basically that π(w ) is
 function of the values πi (w ) only. Remember that this postu-
ate does not contradict our setting only if πi (w ) > 0 , ∀ i, ∀ w ∈ W .
hey also require commutativity ( 3), ordinal unanimity ( 4) and
 form of Fairness ( 5) similar to the one in the ordinal setting of
ection 5.2 . Axiom ( 6) is a variant of the Optimism axiom cast in
erms of a form of strict Pareto dominance Finally, there is also one
ostulate ( 2) requiring that the range of values used in the fu-
ion process is made of consecutive integers (a requirement which
s only justiﬁed by the DENUM representation setting). 
This axiomatic system is again quite in agreement with our ba-
ic postulates, even though there is no use of informational com-
arison between information items, nor any minimal commitment
ssumption, nor any postulate regarding the uselessness of unin-
ormed sources. The lack of such considerations and the fact that
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shey compare their setting with the one of Arrow as well and dis-
uss strategy-proofness, suggest their framework is not solely de-
oted to the search of truth in a body of information items, but like
uthors of [69] , they consider information fusion as encompassing
oth preference and plausibility merging. 
.3. Relation with distance-based knowledge merging 
Possibility distributions over a set consisting of interpretations
f a Boolean language can be encoded as possibilistic knowledge
ases [36] . So, aggregation operations that apply to possibility dis-
ributions can be encoded at the syntactic level into operations
hat merge totally ordered, or stratiﬁed, knowledge bases in pos-
ibilistic logic. The reader is referred to the literature for details
n this topic, especially the works of Benferhat and colleagues
7,8,11,12,62] as well as Liu and colleagues [75,75,89–91,117] . 
It is nevertheless interesting to point out the link between the
istance-based merging approaches that implement fusion rules in
ropositional logic, and the possibilistic fusion setting. 
In the distance-based merging approach [66] , given a proposi-
ional knowledge base K i , a distance between interpretations and
 i is deﬁned as 
(w, K i ) = min 
w ′ |K i 
d(w, w ′ ) , 
here d is a distance between interpretations of the language, for
nstance the Hamming distance counting the number of instanti-
ted variables that differ in w and w ′ . Viewing the set of models
f K i as the core of an information item, and using a Hamming dis-
ance, it is natural to interpret the integer d(w, K i ) as the degree of
isbelief of w given the belief base K i , in the style of Spohn ranking
unctions. It is then easy to construct a possibility distribution ex-
ressing the relative plausibility of w as πi (w ) = d(w,K i ) , for some
ositive  < 1 (which brings the problem inside the DENUM set-
ing). As explained in [7] , it is then easy to reinterpret distance-
ased propositional knowledge-based merging rules in terms of
ggregation operations in possibility theory: 
• The maximum rule proposed in [66,68] corresponds to the nor-
malised minimum rule (5) in possibility theory. Indeed, the in-
terpretations w such that the function max n 
i =1 d(w, K i ) is mini-
mal correspond to the maximal elements of min n i =1 πi (w ) and
form the core of the resulting possibility distribution, which
comes down to a normalisation. The result of the propositional
fusion of K 1 , . . . , K n is then always a consistent classical propo-
sitional base K such that [ K] = { w : π(w ) = Cns min (π1 , . . . , πn ) } .
Note that this fusion rule is not associative, even if max is asso-
ciative. The max rule is one of those proposed by Chopra et al.
[22] in the DENUM setting. 
• The sum rule proposed in [66,68] corresponds to the nor-
malised product rule (6) in possibility theory. Indeed, the in-
terpretations w such that 
∑ n 
i =1 d(w, K i ) is minimal correspond
to the maximal elements of ∗n 
i =1 πi (w ) and form the core of the
resulting possibility distribution, which comes down to a nor-
malisation. The result of the propositional fusion of K 1 , . . . , K n 
is then always a consistent classical propositional base K such
that [ K] = { w : π(w ) = Cns ∗(π1 , . . . , πn ) } . Note that a form of
this fusion rule was already at work in the old expert system
MYCIN (see the corresponding discussion in [45] ). The sum rule
is also one of those proposed in [22] and appears as well in
[71,77] . 
• The GMax fusion rule proposed in [66,68] corresponds to the
leximin rule [34] that reﬁnes the minimum operation applied
to possibility distributions [7] . This operation results in a rank-
ing of interpretations that is ﬁner-grained than the scale of the
inputs. One of the merging rules (called min 1 ) proposed in
[22] encodes the GMax fusion rule by means of integers. • Quota rules for merging knowledge bases are found in [54,91]
and can be explained in the setting of possibility theory as well.
In [75] , an adaptive algorithm for merging stratiﬁed knowledge-
bases (SKBs) is proposed. The algorithm ﬁrst selects among
maximal consistent subsets of sources based on assessing how
(partially) consistent the information pieces in the subset are,
in the spirit of possibilistic merging. However, this paper does
not mention any information ordering between SKBs, refers
neither to Information Monotonicity nor Optimism to advocate
the proposed fusion operators. 
• In the same vein, Hunter and Liu [59] , proposed an adaptive
algorithm for merging possibility distributions. Although infor-
mation ordering, as deﬁned in this paper was not used in [59] ,
the assessment of information quality for ranking information
items was indeed applied in order to generate partially maxi-
mal consistent subsets. 
Note that, in the distance-based merging context, ∀ w ∈
, πi (w ) > 0 so that conjunctive merging rules always satisfy Con-
istency Enforcement and Fairness, hence all basic postulates of
nformation fusion. This condition is not taken for granted in the
sual possibilistic setting, which explains again the absence of MCS
ules in the frameworks of distance-based merging and all settings
ased on the integer scale for grading disbelief. 
These approaches explicitly use the connection between strat-
ﬁed knowledge-bases and plausibility ranking of possible worlds
o deﬁne merging operations. This is also true for the approach
n [117] , where the set of possible worlds is ranked, based on the
et of stratiﬁed knowledge bases, according to a Condorcet-like
ethod after voting systems, prior to reconstructing a stratiﬁed
ase. This method satisﬁes most of the basic postulates as well but
or those involving the information-ordering, a notion not used in
hat paper. 
. A principled view of information fusion in Dempster–Shafer 
heory 
In evidence theory [97,116] , further developed as the Transfer-
ble Belief Model [102] , a piece of information T is modelled by
 basic belief assignment (bba) m T which is a mapping from 2 
W to
0, 1] such that 
∑ 
E⊆W m T (E) = 1 , and m T (∅ ) = 0 . This piece of in-
ormation must be interpreted as an unreliable testimony, whereby
 T ( E ) is the probability that E is the correct information given by
he source. It means that with probability 1 −m T (E) , the piece of
nformation E is irrelevant. A set E with positive mass is called a
ocal set . The set of focal sets is denoted by F m . Given a bba, two
onjugate evaluations can be deﬁned, regarding the conﬁdence it
ives in propositions described by sets A ⊆W : 
• The degree of belief in a proposition A is the probability that
A can be logically inferred from the agent’s body of evidence:
Bel(A ) = ∑ E i ⊆A m T (E i ) ; 
• The degree of plausibility of A is the probability that A is log-
ically consistent with the agent’s body of evidence: P l(A ) =∑ 
E i ∩ A = ∅ m T (E i ) = 1 − Bel(A c ) , where A c is the complement of A .
The uninformative item is captured by the vacuous belief func-
ion : m  such that m  (W ) = 1 . It is well-known [97] that a bba
ubsumes probability distributions (when focal sets are only sin-
letons), and possibility distributions (when focal sets are nested).
n the ﬁrst case, the belief and plausibility functions reduce to a
robability measure; in the latter case they are necessity and pos-
ibility measures respectively. 
30 D. Dubois et al. / Information Fusion 32 (2016) 12–39 
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t7.1. Core, support, plausibility ordering 
Various relevant notions can be deﬁned as follows for a bba m T .
They are instrumental for instantiating the basic properties in evi-
dence theory: 
• Support : if F T ={ A 1 , . . . , A n } , then S(m T )= ⋃ n i =1 A i . 10 
• Core : C(m T ) = 
⋂ n 
i =1 A i . 
• Plausibility ordering : It can be constructed in two ways: 
• using the contour function [97] : πT (w ) = 
∑ 
A ⊆W,w ∈ A m T (A ) =
P l({ w } ) ; this is a natural option for comparing possible
worlds ( w 1 	T w 2 if and only if πT (w 1 ) ≥ πT (w 2 ) ). 
• directly using a kind of dominance between bba’s [37] :
w 1 	dom T w 2 if and only if 
for any A ⊆W \ { w 1 , w 2 } , m T (A ∪ { w 1 } ) ≥ m T (A ∪ { w 2 } ) . 
It is clear that w ∈ S(m T ) if and only if P l({ w } ) > 0 and w ∈
C(m T ) if and only if P l({ w } ) = 1 . Note that the core may be
empty. When the focal sets are nested, the contour function π T of
the bba m T coincides with a possibility distribution, and P l(A ) =
max w ∈ A πT (w ) is a possibility measure. Moreover, bba dominance
	dom 
T 
is a partial ordering coherent with the contour function as
indicated by the easy-to-check result: 
Proposition 10. : 	dom 
T 
is a reﬂexive and transitive relation. More-
over, w 1 	dom T w 2 implies πT (w 1 ) ≥ πT (w 2 ) , and likewise w 1 dom T 
w 2 implies πT (w 1 ) > πT (w 2 ) 
A bba is usually assumed to be self-consistent, i.e., as said ear-
lier, m (∅ ) = 0 . A stronger form of self-consistency requests a non-
empty core, that is, a normalised contour function. However, in the
following we shall still call bba a mass function for which m ( ∅ )
 = 0. Such bba will be called weakly consistent if m ( ∅ )  = 1, and
strongly inconsistent otherwise. 
7.2. Mutual consistency 
We now examine issues related to the notion of conﬂict be-
tween belief functions. 
The degree of inconsistency (or conﬂict) of two bbas m 1 and
m 2 is often measured by the mass bearing on the empty set as
the result of the conjunction of m 1 and m 2 viewed as independent
random sets: 
Inc(m 1 , m 2 ) = 
∑ 
A ∩ B = ∅ 
m 1 (A ) ·m 2 (B ) . 
It is the counterpart of 1 −Cns ∗(π1 , π2 ) in possibility theory, us-
ing conjunction product. However, this index is questionable. It has
been pointed out in [74] that m 1, 2 ( ∅ ) is not a measure of discrep-
ancy between bba’s, since two identical bba’s may have a non-zero
degree of conﬂict 11 . Moreover, assuming independence is an extra
assumption that may or may not be used in the fusion process. 
Alternatively we can adopt deﬁnitions that do not rely on inde-
pendence: two mass functions m and m ′ with focal sets F and F ′ 
are said to be 
• Weakly mutually consistent if ∃ E ∈ F , E ′ ∈ F ′ : E ∩ E ′  = ∅ (note
that it implies that Inc ( m 1 , m 2 ) < 1) 
• Strongly (or logically [29] ) mutually consistent if ∀ E ∈ F , ∀ E ′ ∈
F ′ : E ∩ E ′  = ∅ (note that it does imply that Inc(m 1 , m 2 ) = 0 ). 
It is easy to see that these conditions can only be partially
stated in terms of contour functions. Indeed, m and m ′ are: 10 Often called the core in the literature, which is at odds with, e.g., probability 
theory where this set is also called the support. 
11 A distance function such as d (m 1 , m 2 ) = max A ⊆W (| m 1 (A ) −m 2 (A ) | ) seems more 
appropriate for this kind of discrepancy. 
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l  • weakly mutually consistent if and only if 
max w ∈ W min (πm (w ) , πm ′ (w ))  = 0 
• strongly mutually consistent whenever 
max w ∈ W min (πm (w ) , πm ′ (w )) = 1 . 
The converse of the last statement does not hold, since
ax w ∈ W min (πm (w ) , πm ′ (w )) = 1 presupposes the use of belief
unctions with non-empty cores. 
Note that the above deﬁnitions do not involve the mass func-
ions, and are all-or-nothing concepts, which may not be fully sat-
sfactory. Strong mutual consistency is nevertheless very natural
s it means that each pair of focal sets coming from each belief
unction is consistent. It is weaker than the strong consistency of
heir contour functions. However, weak mutual consistency can be
udged too weak. An alternative stronger deﬁnition of consistency
ay be as follows [29,40] : 
eﬁnition 2. Two mass functions m 1 and m 2 are said to be mutu-
lly probabilistically consistent if there exists a joint mass function
 (B, C) , B ∈ F 1 , C ∈ F 2 such that ∑ 
 ∈F 1 
x (B, C) = m 2 (C) , ∀ C ∈ F 2 ; (10)
∑ 
∈F 2 
x (B, C) = m 1 (B ) , ∀ B ∈ F 1 ; (11)
 (B, C) = 0 whenever B ∩ C = ∅ . (12)
∑ 
 ∈F 1 ,C∈F 2 
x (B, C) = 1 . (13)
The two ﬁrst sets of equalities say that m 1 and m 2 are
arginals of x ( ·, ·); the third one forbids to allocate positive mass to
airs of conﬂicting focal sets (then x ( ·, ·) is strongly self-consistent).
Given a belief function, it is well-known that the set of prob-
bilities M (m ) = { P : P (A ) ≥ Bel(A ) , ∀ A } is non-empty and convex.
t is called the credal set induced by m . The above deﬁnition of
onsistency is equivalent to saying that the two credal sets M (m 1 )
nd M (m 2 ) have a non-empty intersection [20] , which explains
he name of this type of consistency. A degree of probabilistic con-
istency between m 1 and m 2 can then be deﬁned as 
 C(m 1 , m 2 ) = sup 
x 
∑ 
B ∈F 1 ,C∈F 2 ,B ∩ C  = ∅ 
x (B, C) 
here x is any joint mass assignment with marginals m 1 and m 2 
not necessarily obeying (16) ). This consistency index has better
ehaviour than 1 − Inc(m 1 , m 2 ) . First, it does not presuppose inde-
endence between m 1 and m 2 . Moreover, it obeys intuitively satis-
actory properties that the other index violates: 
roposition 11. Index PC obeys the following properties: 
• For any normalised mass function m, P C(m, m ) = 1 . 
• P C(m 1 , m 2 ) = 1 if and only if m 1 and m 2 are mutually probabilis-
tically consistent . 
Proof . Indeed for the case when m 1 = m 2 = m, it is enough to
hoose x (A, A ) = m (A ) , ∀ A ⊆W to get P C(m, m ) = ∑ A ⊆W m (A ) = 1 .
he other point is obvious as probabilistic consistency precisely
onsists in the possibility to assign joint masses in agreement to
he given marginals only to non-conﬂicting sets. 
Note that even if m 1 and m 2 are weakly mutually consistent,
hey may be probabilistically inconsistent ( P C(m 1 , m 2 ) = 0 ), in con-
rast with Inc ( m 1 , m 2 ) that will always be less than 1). Besides,
trong mutual consistency ensures P C(m 1 , m 2 ) = 1 . 
The drawback of our conﬂict index is that it needs to run a
inear programming algorithm to compute it in practice. Recently,
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T  estercke and Burger [28] have proposed an axiomatic setting for
easures of conﬂict, that has some connection with our postulates.
owever, they propose degrees of conﬁct that use contour func-
ions and are easier to compute. 
.3. Information ordering 
In the literature, different information orderings in evidence
heory have been proposed for comparing the information contents
f bba’s. We only consider the most basic ones (see e.g. [29,41] ) 
eﬁnition 3 (c-ordering) . m 1  c m 2 if ∀ w ∈ W, πm 1 (w ) ≤ πm 2 (w ) . 
This is a straightforward extension of the speciﬁcity ordering
f possibility theory. It very much lacks discrimination as it only
elies on the plausibility of singletons. 
eﬁnition 4 (pl-ordering) . [41] m 1  pl m 2 , if ∀ A ⊆W , pl 1 ( A ) ≤
l 2 ( A ). 
This kind of information ordering is much in line with the un-
erstanding of belief functions as a special family of probability
unctions since m 1  pl m 2 is equivalent to the inclusion between the
orresponding credal sets: M (m 1 ) ⊆pl M (m 2 ) . 
The next deﬁnition requires the notion of a commonality func-
ion q induced by a bba m T [97] : q (A ) = 
∑ 
E i ⊇A m T (E i ) . Clearly de-
rees of commonality tend to be all the greater as masses are al-
ocated to larger focal sets. 
eﬁnition 5 (q-ordering) . [41] m 1  q m 2 if ∀ A ⊆W , q 1 ( A ) ≤ q 2 ( A ). 
It means that, by and large, m 2 assign masses to larger subsets
han m 1 , which sounds like m 2 being the last informative of the
wo bba’s. 
eﬁnition 6 (Specialisation) . [41,64] Let m 1 and m 2 be two bbas
ver W , m 1 is a specialisation of m 2 , denoted by m 1  s m 2 if and
nly if there exists a non-negative matrix joint bba with general
erm x ( A , B ), A ∈F 1 , B ∈F 2 such that ∑ 
 ∈F 1 
x (A, B ) = m 2 (B ) , ∀ B ∈ F 2 ; (14) 
∑ 
 ∈F 2 
x (A, B ) = m 1 (A ) , ∀ A ∈ F 1 ; (15) 
 (A, B ) = 0 whenever A  B. (16) 
∑ 
 ∈F 1 ,C∈F 2 
x (B, C) = 1 . (17) 
Note that a necessary condition for specialisation (or s-
rdering) is that ∀ A ∈ F 1 , ∃ B ∈ F 2 , A ⊆ B and ∀ B ∈ F 2 , ∃ A ∈ F 1 , A ⊆
 . Moreover, this deﬁnition is in full agreement with the deﬁnition
f probabilistic consistency between bba’s (notice the strong simi-
arity between their respective deﬁnitions). 
Relationships among these orderings are as follows [41] : s-
rdering implies pl-ordering and q-ordering, but the converse is
alse. Both are more demanding than the c-ordering. Hence the s-
rdering is the strongest ordering of the four, and c-ordering the
eakest. Moreover, they all coincide with the speciﬁcity ordering
f possibility theory when the focal sets are nested. However, the
l-ordering and the q-ordering are not comparable and can be at
dds with one another: it is easy to ﬁnd bba’s m 1 and m 2 such
hat m 1 pl m 2 and m 2 q m 1 , in which case the contour functions
re equal [29] , which may baﬄe the intuition. These arguments
lea for the use of specialisation as the most natural information
rdering in the setting of evidence theory. .4. Instantiation of basic fusion postulates in evidence theory 
There are several possible ways of instantiating the basic postu-
ates of information fusion for belief functions, due to several no-
ions of mutual consistency, information ordering, plausibility or-
ering, and the like. 
In the following we give one possible instantiation which may
e appealing because it is as little constrained as possible. To this
nd we use specialisation, dominance ordering, and strong mu-
ual consistency. For the sake of simplicity we write the postulates
or two bba’s m 1 and m 2 , denoting by m 12 the result of the fu-
ion. In order to build a combination rule we also need a depen-
ence structure between sources that is expressed by the joint bba,
amely we must know the joint bba is x ( ·, ·) whose marginals are
 1 and m 2 . On this basis, two straightforward extensions of the
et-theoretic intersection and union can then be deﬁned for ran-
om sets: 
 E ⊂W, m 1 ∩ 2 (E) = 
∑ 
E= F ∩ G x (F , G ) . (18) 
 E ⊂W, m 1 ∪ 2 (E) = 
∑ 
E= F ∪ G x (F , G ) . (19) 
ne assumption often made is independence between pieces of
nformation provided by sources, so that x (F , G ) = m 1 (F ) ·m 2 (G ) .
hen these combination rules are the ones already known in the
iterature [42,100] , except that, here, the joint bba is x ( ·, ·) instead
f the product of bba’s that requests an independence assumption
etween the two random sets. In the latter case, we denote m 1 ∩ 2 
y m 1 "m 2 , and m 1 ∪ 2 by m 1 ⊕m 2 . 
This dependence or independence assumption does not affect
he postulates below. Namely, fusion postulates do not have to im-
ose a particular dependence structure between sources. 
1. Unanimity 
• Possibility preservation : If w ∈ C(m 1 ) ∩ C(m 2 ) then, w ∈
C(m 12 ) . 
• Impossibility preservation : If w ∈ S(m 1 ) ∪ S(m 2 ) , then w ∈
S(m 12 ) . 
• An additional requirement can be local ordinal unanimity
with respect to dominance ordering: for two any states w
and w ′ : if w 	dom 
1 
w ′ and w 	dom 
2 
w ′ then w 	dom 
12 
w ′ . 
2. Weak Information monotonicity : If m 1 and m 2 are strongly con-
sistent, and m 1  s m ′ 1 , m 2  s m ′ 2 , then m 12  s m ′ 12 . 
3. Consistency enforcement : 
•
∑ 
E⊆S m 12 (E) = 1 (strong version). 
• E ⊆ S m 12 ( E ) > 0 (weak version). 
4. Optimism 
• If m 1 and m 2 are strongly mutually consistent, then m 12  s 
m i , i = 1 , 2 . 
• There exists a joint bba x ( ·, ·) whose marginals are m 1 and
m 2 , such that m 12  s m 1 ∪ 2 . 
5. Fairness 
• No Favourite : If m 1 and m 2 are not strongly mutually consis-
tent, then m 12  s m i , i = 1 , 2 
• No Dismissal : Each m i should be weakly consistent with m 12 .
6. Insensitivity to vacuous information : If m 1 (W ) = 1 then m 12 =
m 2 . 
7. Symmetry : m 12 = m 21 . 
8. Minimal commitment : m 12 should be minimally speciﬁc for spe-
cialisation. 
Some comments are in order. For Consistency Enforcement, the
hoice between strong and weak version depends on whether
he result of the combination rule should be normalised or
ot. The optimism postulate again expresses that we favour con-
unctive rules of combination when sources strongly agree and that
e should assume at least one source is correct if they disagree.
he latter involves the disjunctive combination rule m . In the1 ∪ 2 
32 D. Dubois et al. / Information Fusion 32 (2016) 12–39 
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∀Fairness axiom, we have provided the two sides of it explicitly,
because they are no longer redundant, since we do not use the
same form of mutual consistency on each side. Finally, minimal
commitment could be expressed in the sense of any suitable in-
formation ordering relation. The choice of a dependence structure
between the sources expressed via the joint bba x ( ·, ·) reduces the
scope of the minimal commitment axiom and the role of the pos-
tulates to the choice of a proper set-theoretic combination for focal
sets. 
7.5. Examples of fusion rules 
Let us consider a few known combination rules in the the-
ory of belief functions, to be evaluated in the light of the above
postulates. Many combination rules have been proposed in evi-
dence theory for merging information, apart from the well-known
Dempster’s rule of combination. For the sake of simplicity, we
only focus on the main combination rules, although many variants
have been proposed in the literature (see [101] for an extensive
review). 
m De (C) = 
{ ∑ 
A,B : A ∩ B = C m 1 (A ) ·m 2 (B ) 
1 −∑ A,B : A ∩ B = ∅ m 1 (A ) ·m 2 (B ) , ∀ C  = ∅ , 
0 if C = ∅ . 
(Dempster’s rule) (20)
m Sm (C) = 
∑ 
A,B ⊆W,A ∩ B = C 
m 1 (A ) ·m 2 (B ) = m 1 "m 2 (C) 
(Smets’ rule) [101] (21)
m Ya (C) = 
⎧ ⎨ 
⎩ 
∑ 
A,B : A ∩ B = C m 1 (A ) ·m 2 (B ) if C  = W, ∅ 
m 1 (W ) ·m 2 (W ) + 
∑ 
A ∩ B = ∅ m 1 (A ) ·m 2 (B ) if C = W, 
0 if C = ∅ . 
(Yager’s rule) [114] (22)
m DP (C) = 
⎧ ⎨ 
⎩ 
∑ 
A,B : A ∩ B = C m 1 (A ) ·m 2 (B ) 
+ ∑ A,B : A ∪ B = C,A ∩ B = ∅ m 1 (A ) ·m 2 (B ) , ∀ C  = ∅ , 
0 if C = ∅ . 
(23)
The most celebrated fusion rule is an associative operation called
Dempster rule of combination [27,97] . All four fusion rules presup-
pose independence between sources, as an additional assumption,
which enforces the choice of x (·, ·) = m 1 (·) ·m 2 (·) . The main dif-
ference between Dempster’s rule and the three other rules respec-
tively proposed in [102] (see also [100] ) [113] , and [45] concern
the way the mass (m 1 "m 2 )(∅ ) = 
∑ 
A,B : A ∩ B = ∅ m 1 (A ) ·m 2 (B ) is re-
allocated. In Dempster’s rule, the renormalisation by division en-
forces consistency preservation, when the two bba’s are weakly
consistent (otherwise the operation is not deﬁned). Smets’s rule
simply keeps this mass on ∅ , whilst Yager’s rule assigns it to W .
The DP rule keeps the mass m 1 ( A ) · m 2 ( B ) on A ∩ B whenever this
intersection is not empty, and gives it to A ∪ B otherwise. 
All four fusion rules coincide with each other if the two bba’s
are strongly consistent. Then all postulates are satisﬁed. When∑ 
A ∩ B = ∅ m 1 (A ) ·m 2 (B ) = 1 , m De is not deﬁned due to a total con-
ﬂict between the sources, which violates the Consistency Enforce-
ment postulate, like for the normalised conjunctive rules in pos-
sibility theory. When the two bba’s are weakly mutually consis-
tent, the result is consistent since m De (∅ ) = 0 . For instance, sup-
pose that m and m are weakly mutually consistent in a minimal1 2 ay, namely if there is a single pair A ∈ F 1 , B ∈ F 2 , such that A ∩ B
= ∅ , which is a situation of severe conﬂict. Then m De (A ∩ B ) = 1 ,
o m De  m 1 ⊕m 2 as soon as there are C ∈ F 1 , D ∈ F 2 , such that
 ∩ B C ∪ D , since the mass m De ( A ∩ B ) cannot ﬂow to all focal sets
f m 1 ⊕m 2 . The afore-mentioned situation shows that Dempster’s
ule of combination is over-optimistic in case of weak consistency;
t may fail to satisfy the second optimism condition, due to renor-
alisation (it would satisfy it if we replace it by the weaker con-
ition S(m 12 ) ⊆ S(m 1 ) ∪ S(m 2 ) ). 
Smets [100] has advocated a non-normal version (21) of Demp-
ter combination rule, which comes down to a mere intersection
f independent random sets. In Smets rule, the mass assigned
o the empty set m S ( ∅ ), may be different from 0, and can even
e 1. Thus, Smets rule does not respect the Consistency Enforce-
ent principle, even if it is always deﬁned, since it may deliver
he plain empty set in case m 1 and m 2 are strongly inconsis-
ent. Like Dempster rule of combination, Smets’ rule is purely con-
unctive, hence does not behave in agreement with the postulates
n case of partial mutual inconsistency. The Fairness axiom for-
ally fails with this fusion rule because it is not compatible with
he failure of the Consistency Enforcement postulate. Optimism
s recovered at the expense of internal consistency of the result,
hich is subnormalised in case of weakly consistent inputs. So,
hile Dempster rule is overoptimistic, Smets rule gives up internal
onsistency. 
Yager [113] proposed another form of renormalisation that en-
ures a strongly internally consistent result, while making the
ombination applicable to any pair of bba’s, by reassigning the
ass m S ( ∅ ) to the whole set W . It does not respect optimism
nd moreover, impossibility preservation is clearly violated. The
ailure of Optimism can be observed if the two bba’s are not
trongly consistent, that is when m Ya ( W ) > m 1 ( W ) · m 2 ( W ). Then
he condition m Ya  s m 1 ⊕m 2 may fail because m Ya ( W ) has become
oo large. In fact this rule is far too cautious in the presence of
onﬂicts. 
Regarding local ordinal unanimity we can prove the following 
roposition 12. Dempster, Smets and Yager combination rules obey
ocal ordinal unanimity with respect to dominance ordering. 
roof. We prove for Smets rule ﬁrst. Suppose w 1 	dom 1 w 2 and
 1 	dom 2 w 2 , namely that for any A ⊆W \ { w 1 , w 2 } , m i (A ∪ { w 1 } ) ≥
 i (A ∪ { w 2 } ) for i = 1 , 2 . Then we must prove that for any C ⊆
 \ { w 1 , w 2 } , ∑ 
C∪{ w 1 } = F ∩ G m 1 (F ) ·m 2 (G ) ≥
∑ 
C∪{ w 2 } = F ∩ G m 1 (F ) ·m 2 (G ) . 
Note that if C ∪ { w 1 } = F ∩ G then F = F ′ ∪ C ∪ { w 1 } and F = G ′ ∪
 ∪ { w 1 } , with F ′ , G ′ ⊆W \ { w 1 , w 2 } and likewise for w 2 . The latter
nequality reads: ∑ 
F ′ ,G ′ ⊆W \{ w 1 ,w 2 } m 1 (F 
′ ∪ C ∪ { w 1 } ) ·m 2 (G ′ ∪ C ∪ { w 1 } ) 
≥∑ F ′ ,G ′ ⊆W \{ w 1 ,w 2 } m 1 (F ′ ∪ C ∪ { w 2 } ) ·m 2 (G ′ ∪ C ∪ { w 2 } ) 
which holds since 
m 1 (F 
′ ∪ C ∪ { w 1 } ) ·m 2 (G ′ ∪ C ∪ { w 1 } ) ≥ m 1 (F ′ ∪ C ∪ { w 2 } ) ·
 2 (G 
′ ∪ C ∪ { w 2 } ) from the working assumption. 
As to Dempster rule of combination, note that the mass func-
ion obtained differs from the one in Smets rule only by a multi-
licative coeﬃcient. 
Yager rule respects Local Ordinal Unanimity for dominance,
ince the obtained bba differs from Smets rule result only by
dding a constant to the mass of W . 
The combination rule (23) directly extends the basic fusion rule
3) for two sets, from Section 4.1 , and was proposed by Dubois and
rade [45] . Again, it coincides with Dempster’s rule of combination
nd Smets’ conjunctive rule, and Yager’s as well if and only if the
wo mass functions are strongly consistent, that is, ∀ F , m 1 ( F ) > 0,
 G , m ( G ) > 0, F ∩ G  = ∅ . 2 
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Table 3 
Properties of combination rules in evidence theory. 
rule/Prop Una Mono Vacuous Cons Opti Fair Min-Com 
Dempster Yes 1 Yes Yes Stronga No Yes a No 
Smets Yes b Yes Yes b No Yes No Yes b 
Yager No Yes Yes b Strong No Yes Yes 
DP Yes Yes Yes Strong Yes Yes Yes 
a Only when deﬁned. 
b Trivially in case of strong inconsistency. 
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c  roposition 13. The DP fusion rule (23) satisﬁes all fusion postulates
tated for belief functions. 
Proof It goes just as for the basic fusion rule for two sets
3) . We only clarify the possibly not obvious issues. Impossibil-
ty preservation is ensured by the fact that masses m 1 ( F ) · m 2 ( G )
re never allocated outside F ∪ G . As a consequence, m 12  s m 1 ∪ 2 
just reallocate to F ∪ G the masses m 1 ( F ) · m 2 ( G ) allocated to F ∩ G
hen F ∩ G  = ∅ . For fairness, consider the No Favourite property: if
 ∩ G = ∅ the mass allocated to F ∪ G can be reallocated neither to F
or to G , and in general there is no focal set of m i that will contain
 ∪ G , or if it does, the mass m DP ( F ∪ G ) may well be larger than the
um of the masses m i ( C ) for F ∪ G ⊆C . The No Dismissal is obvious.
inimal commitment holds because, once the dependence struc-
ure is ﬁxed, it is applied for each pair of focal sets, one for m 1 ,
ne for m 2 like for the rule (3) . 
Note that Dempster rule and Smets rule are associative, while
he other aggregation methods are not. However, Yager’s rule is
uasi-associative (apply Smets rule to the n inputs, then renor-
alise the result by transferring the mass on the empty set to the
hole set W ) and Dubois and Prade combination rule can be read-
ly extended to n > 2 independent sources, using the MCS rule (4)
n all n -tuples of focal sets: ∀ E  = ∅ , 
 DP−n (E) = 
∑ 
F 1 , ... ,F n : E= f MCS n (F 1 , ... ,F n ) 
m 1 ( F 1 ) · . . . ·m n ( F n ) (24)
The above results are summarised by Table 3 (all above rules
re symmetric). 
As already said, the fusion rules considered in this section can
e generalised, replacing the product of bba’s m 1 ( F ) · m 2 ( G ) by a
uitably chosen joint mass function x ( E , F ) whose marginals are
 1 and m 2 . If we give up choosing a dependence structure, we
an replace strong consistency by probabilistic consistency, that is
ll four fusion rules would coincide with m 12 (E) = 
∑ 
E= F ∩ G x (E, F )
f m 1 and m 2 are probabilistically mutually consistent. However,
here may be several minimally speciﬁc fusion rules, if we leave
he choice of x ( E , F ) open [29] . 
. Information fusion in probability theory 
A probability distribution can be used to serve either of two
urposes: modelling of random phenomena (it is then said to be
bjective), and modelling belief (it is then said to be personal or
ubjective). In the latter case, a probability distribution is attached
o the observer rather than to the observed phenomenon. This is
hat we assume here, since each information item we consider is
ttached to a source. 
A subjective probability distribution is arguably the full-ﬂedged
pposite to set-valued representation of incomplete knowledge: it
annot represent incomplete knowledge understood as partial ig-
orance faithfully. On the contrary, probability distributions are tai-
ored to aleatory uncertainty. This point has been abundantly doc-
mented in the literature. Three main points can be stressed [51] : 
1. The uniform probability distribution is ambiguous, it cannot tell
fair dice from unknown ones, but for the fact that the uniformdistribution representing the former is objective, while the one
representing the latter is subjective. 
2. Probabilistic representations of ignorance are questionably scale
or language-dependent: for instance a uniform distribution on a
linear scale does not remain uniform after a non-linear mono-
tonic transformation (e.g. logarithmic). This is acceptable if the
distribution represents frequentist information, less so for igno-
rance. 
3. In the presence of ambiguity or incomplete information, people
do not make decision in agreement with expected utility based
on a unique subjective probability distribution on states of na-
ture, as revealed by Ellsberg paradox [53] . 
Actually a probability distribution should be understood as a
eighted collection of conﬂicting singletons, in contrast with belief
unctions or possibility distributions that account for a collection of
ore or less reliable disjunctive sets representing incomplete infor-
ation. Contrary to the basic fusion modes of disjunctive sets that
ome down to a conjunction or a disjunction, there are no such
onnectives available in probability theory (conjunction and dis-
unction are not closed operations for singletons). Only the setting
f evidence theory can shed light on what could be a conjunction
r a disjunction of probability distributions (e.g. the union of ran-
om singletons is a mass function bearing on focal sets with one
nd two elements). 
Nevertheless, beginning in the 1960s, there is a large litera-
ure on the fusion of subjective probability measures, split in two
chools. When parallel fusion is taken for granted (see for instance
24] ), the result is often required to be a weighted average of orig-
nal probabilities. Under the Bayesian approach [57,84] , the fusion
rocess is in fact a combined revision/fusion process due to the
resence of a prior probability. Moreover, its application requires a
ot of information to be available (for instance, prior probabilities).
As explained quite early by Walley [109] , the framework of im-
recise probability is much more convenient than the one of single
ubjective probability in order to discuss the problem of merging
eliefs, since the latter are inherently imprecise. In fact, the rep-
esentation of belief by imprecise probability is but a slight varia-
ion of the standard exchangeable betting behaviour setting [110] .
owadays, imprecise probabilities have been extensively developed
nd found applications in many real-world scenarios [4] . 
.1. Representing beliefs by convex sets of probabilities 
In this section, it is assumed that information items take the
orm of convex sets of ﬁnitely additive probabilities on W , denoted
y M . This representation is justiﬁed by Walley as a rational ap-
roach to representing coherent beliefs, after some previous works
y Smith [103] and Williams [112] , extending De Finetti’s frame-
ork for subjective probabilities [55] . We brieﬂy provide an ac-
ount of this view. 
Like in the personalist approaches to probability [55] , belief is
easured by the propensity of an agent to buy or gamble with
ncertain outcomes. Walley’s theory presupposes that the real line
odels a well-deﬁned currency system, where positive values rep-
esent gains and negative values represent losses. A gamble is a
ounded mapping X : W → R , interpreted as a random function
hat delivers X(w ) currency units if the actual world turns out to
e w . A set of gambles desirable for an agent is denoted by D. It
atisﬁes the following rationality properties [110] : 
1. If X ∈ D then ∀ λ > 0 , λX ∈ D. 
2. If X ∈ D and Y ∈ D, then, X + Y ∈ D. 
3. If X ≥ 0, X  = 0 then X ∈ D (Accepting partial gain) 
4. If X ≤ 0, X  = 0 then X / ∈ D (Refusing partial loss) 
A set of gambles takes the form of a positive cone in R W , ex-
luding the origin 0. There is a range of prices an agent accepts to
34 D. Dubois et al. / Information Fusion 32 (2016) 12–39 
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 pay for getting gamble X . The maximal price, E ( X ), based on a set
D of desirable gambles, is deﬁned as 
E (X ) = sup { x ∈ R : X − x ∈ D} , 
where [ X − x ](w ) = X(w ) − x, also called a lower prevision. E ( X )
is superadditive ( E (X + Y ) ≥ E (X ) + E (Y ) ), homogeneous ( E (λX ) =
λE (X ) , ∀ λ > 0 ), and such that E (X ) ≥ inf { X(w ) : w ∈ W } . E ( X ) is
called a lower prevision and can be interpreted as the lower bound
of a family of expected values of X with respect to a set of proba-
bilities called a credal set : 
M ( E ) = { P : E P (X ) ≥ E (X ) } , 
where E P ( X ) is the expected value of X w.r.t. probability P . 
If an agent provides a set of allegedly maximal buying prices
ρ(X 1 ) , . . . , ρ(X n ) for gambles X 1 , . . . , X n , this assignment is said to
ensure a sure loss if the associated credal set M ρ = { P : E P (X ) ≥
ρ(X i ) , ∀ i = 1 , . . . , n } is empty. If not empty, the assignment is
said to be coherent if ∀ i = 1 , . . . , n, the lower expectation E (X i ) =
inf { E P (X ) : P ∈ M ρ} precisely equals ρ( X i ), i.e. the proposed prices
cannot be increased without changing the credal set. 
Conversely, any convex subset M is characterised by the lower
expectations on gambles E M (X ) = inf { E P (X ) : P ∈ M} inducing the
set of almost desirable gambles D = { X : E M (X ) ≥ 0 } . Note that the
upper expectation E (X ) = −E (−X ) is the least price at which the
agent accepts to sell X . In the classical exchangeable bet approach
[55] , the buying and selling prices are the same and E (X ) = E (X )
is the expectation with respect to a single probability distribution. 
Under the subjectivist interpretation due to Walley [110] , epis-
temic states are characterised by a credal set. Of course, credal sets
can also represent imprecise information about an otherwise pre-
cise random phenomenon. In any case, information supplied by a
source can take the form of a credal set, which is more general
than all other frameworks encountered so far. Credal sets M in-
duce upper and lower probabilities on events, of the form 
P (A ) = inf { P (A ) : P ∈ M}; P (A ) = sup { P (A ) : P ∈ M} = 1 − P (A
Degrees of belief attached to propositions take the form of lower
probabilities. However, the credal set M can generally not be re-
covered from the knowledge of the lower probabilities on events
it induces, as in general M ⊂ { P : P (A ) ≥ P (A ) } . Nevertheless there
are noticeable set-functions that are special cases of coherent
lower or upper probabilities [111] : 
• 2-monotone (convex) capacities g such that g(A ∪ B ) + g(A ∩ B )
≥ g(A ) + g(B ) . Then M (g) = { P : P (A ) ≥ g(A ) }  = ∅ . It holds that
P (A ) = inf { P (A ) : P ∈ M (g) } = g(A ) . 
• Belief functions, that are ∞ -monotone: M (m ) = { P : P (A ) ≥
Bel(A ) }  = ∅ . It holds that P (A ) = inf { P (A ) : P ∈ M (m ) } = Bel(A ) .
• Necessity measures: M (π ) = { P : P (A ) ≥ N(A ) }  = ∅ . It holds
that P (A ) = inf { P (A ) : P ∈ M (π ) } = N(A ) . 
• Sets: M (T ) = { P : P (T ) = 1 } . 
• Single probability measures: M = { P } is then a singleton. 
The information ordering between credal sets M and M ′ is de-
ﬁned by the inclusion ordering M ⊆ M ′ , whereby M is at least
as informative as M ′ . Two credal sets are mutually inconsistent if
their intersection is empty. Hence, basic concepts of informational
comparison and mutual consistency for credal sets are the same
as for mere set-valued representations of information items. The
plausibility ordering induced by M can be deﬁned by means of
the upper probability of singletons, in agreement with the possi-
bility theory and belief function settings. 
8.2. Walley’s merging axioms 
In an unpublished research note [109] , Walley gave a detailed
account of postulates for information fusion taking the form ofredal sets representing agent opinions, emphasising four general
equirements 
a) the aggregated opinion should be coherent; 
b) if all agents of the group desire a certain gamble, so should re-
ﬂect the aggregated result; 
c) an aggregation result should at least partially reﬂect the opin-
ions of each agent (what Walley calls a reconciliation ); 
d) an aggregation result should reﬂect any level of indeterminacy
shared by all agents. 
These concerns prove to be in agreement with our approach to
nformation fusion, and Walley’s unpublished report can clearly be
een as a pioneering reﬂexion on information fusion. To implement
hese four concerns, ﬁfteen axioms were precisely stated mathe-
atically, in terms of credal sets, sets of desirable gambles, and
ower previsions, respectively. Below, we recall these axioms (num-
ered after Walley and using his terminology) and compare them
ith our common properties listed above, emphasising the credal
et point of view that is more in agreement with our set-based
etting. 
Suppose n sources supplying n credal sets M i (with associated
esirable sets of gambles D i , and lower previsions E i ( X )), and let
he merged result be f (M 1 , . . . , M n ) . 
Criterion 1: (Coherence). f (M 1 , . . . , M n ) should be a credal set
(a convex set of probability measures). 
This criterion is captured by our Property 3 (Consistency en-
forcement). 
Criterion 2: (Unanimity). f (M 1 , . . . , M n ) ⊆ H( 
⋃ n 
i =1 M i ) where
H denotes the convex hull. 
This criterion is a variant of our property 1b (Impossibil-
ity preservation). The use of a convex hull is motivated by
the need to get a credal set as a result, which 
⋃ n 
i =1 M i is
not. It can be justiﬁed in terms of desirable gambles as the
property is provably equivalent to 
⋂ n 
i =1 D i ⊆ D where D is
the set of desirable gambles associated to f (M 1 , . . . , M n )
(requirement (b) above). In terms of lower previsions, it is
E (X ) ≥ min n i =1 E i (X ) , which also provides min n i =1 P i (A ) as a
lower bound to the resulting lower probabilities. 
Criterion 3: (Reconciliation). If 
⋂ n 
i =1 M i = ∅ , then
f (M 1 , . . . , M n ) ∩ M i  = ∅ , ∀ i = 1 , . . . , n . 
It corresponds exactly to our Fairness property 5. In terms of
desirable gambles, Walley proves that this condition comes
down to never let a gamble X be accepted by the group of
sources if one of them ﬁnds its opposite −X strictly desir-
able. In terms of lower previsions, it is E (X ) ≤ min n i =1 E i (X ) ,
which also provides min n i =1 P i (A ) as an upper bound to the
resulting lower probabilities. Clearly, this property ensures
that if the opinions of the sources are described by differ-
ent single probability functions, the result can then never be
an additive probability measure, as it should be a credal set
containing all input distinct probabilities. 
Criterion 4: (Indeterminacy) 
⋂ n 
i =1 M i ⊆ f (M 1 , . . . , M n ) 
This is clearly our Possibility preservation property 1a; it
implies that the resulting information cannot be more pre-
cise than what the group considers jointly to be possible. In
terms of desirable gambles it says that the collective desir-
able gamble set is contained in the “additive closure” of the
D i , that is, { ∑ n i =1 X i : X i ∈ D i , ∀ i = 1 , . . . , n } . The translation of
this postulate in terms of lower previsions is less palatable. 
The two stronger forms below deal with situations when
agents have inconsistent beliefs. 
Criterion 5: (Strong indeterminacy): It consists in replacing∑ n 
i =1 X i : X i ∈ D i , ∀ i = 1 , . . . , n by 
⋃ n 
i =1 D i in the previous cri-
terion: if no agent of the group ﬁnds X desirable, then the
group should not ﬁnd X desirable. It is far less obvious to
D. Dubois et al. / Information Fusion 32 (2016) 12–39 35 
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 express in terms of credal sets, except that ultimately, it
seems to enforce 
⋂ n 
i =1 M i ⊂ f (M 1 , . . . , M n ) , which is hardly
acceptable (it is not clear why we forbid equality in the
case of consistency between the credal sets). It also reads
E (X ) ≥ max n 
i =1 E i (X ) . 
Criterion 6: (Strong Pareto): This criterion is again hard to ex-
press with credal sets. In terms of gambles it says that a
gamble X can stand as the result of merging if it is de-
sirable for at least one agent, and is not strictly undesir-
able for other agents. Despite its intuitive appeal in this
form, it violates coherence. This is because it reads E (X ) ≥
min ( max n 
i =1 E i (X ) , min 
n 
i =1 E i (X )) . That it may lead to incon-
sistency is patent if we notice that the set-functions g 1 (A ) =
max n 
i =1 P i (A ) and g 2 (A ) = min 
n 
i =1 P i (A ) can be any capacity,
that is, the credal sets induced by g 1 and g 2 can be empty. 
Criterion 7: (Strong reconciliation): If for some subset I of inte-
gers, 
⋂ n 
i ∈ I M i  = ∅ , then f (M 1 , . . . , M n ) 
⋂ n 
i ∈ I M i  = ∅ . 
This is clearly the optimistic form of the Fairness property,
already mentioned in Section 3.2 , according to which the
outcome of merging should be determined by the merged
opinions of consistent sources. One can consider it is Fair-
ness plus the Optimism axiom applied to subset of sources. 
Criterion 8: (Conjunction): If 
⋂ n 
i ∈ I M i  = ∅ , then
f (M 1 , . . . , M n ) ⊆
⋂ n 
i =1 M i . 
This criterion is covered by the Optimism postulate. In terms
of desirable gambles it writes 
∑ n 
i =1 X i ∈ D whenever X i ∈
D i , ∀ i = 1 , . . . , n . 
Criterion 9: (Total reconciliation): f (M 1 , . . . , M n ) ⊇
⋃ n 
i =1 M i 
In terms of desirable gambles, it says that a gamble can be
accepted by the set of sources only if it is accepted by all of
them. In terms of lower previsions, E (X ) ≤ min n i =1 E i (X ) . This
is a very conservative property at odds with Optimism, and
that is questionable as it allows for non-informative merged
results (e.g. P (A) = 0) from informative inputs (e.g., P i (A ) >
0 , ∀ i = 1 , . . . , n ). 
Criterion 10: (Symmetry): All agents play the same role if no
particular additional information is available that allows to
prioritise some sources over the others. This is our Commu-
tativity property. 
Criterion 11: (Complete ignorance): An agent providing no in-
formation can be ignored during merging. This criterion is
exactly our Insensitivity to Vacuous Information postulate. 
Criterion 12: (Relative ignorance): An agent with beliefs that
can be subsumed by the beliefs of each of the remaining
agents can be ignored in the result of merging. This is a
strengthening of Insensitivity to Vacuous Information, which
makes sense if the aggregation is idempotent. It is insensi-
tivity to redundant information, which could read for two
sources and any representation framework: if T 1  T 2 , then
f (T 1 , T 2 ) = T 1 . However, it becomes questionable in the case
of independent sources, when reinforcement effects are al-
lowed. 
Criterion 13: (Aggregation of aggregation): Merging can be
done step-by-step, merging the partial result with the infor-
mation of the next source. This is a weak version of asso-
ciativity, but still very demanding. Along with the three ﬁrst
criteria, it enforces a disjunctive combination H( 
⋃ n 
i =1 M i ) as
a result. Then the result of merging does not depend on
whether the sources are mutually consistent or not. 
Criterion 14: (Continuity): This criterion says that aggregated
opinions should not be sensitive to small changes in inputs.
This criterion is akin to the Non-Sensitivity property. But
we have seen that this criterion is not compatible with the
proper handling of inconsistent sources, that require a form
of merging different from consistent ones. This criterion is
easy to fulﬁl with consistent sources only. Criterion 15: (Updating): This is a request for commuting revi-
sion and merging: The revision of the merged information
should be the result of merging revised original information
items. This criterion is out of scope of our study that re-
stricts to the postulates of information fusion. However, in
a more general perspective, it may be natural to consider
fusion and revision to occur at the same time. 
It is clear that there is a signiﬁcant overlap between our pos-
ulates in the general case, and Walley criteria for merging convex
ets of probabilities. In fact Walley’s axiomatic setting covers our
roperties 1,3, 4, 5, 6, 7 explicitly. Walley mentions no counter-
art to the Information monotonicity property 2, not does he use
inimal commitment in the axioms. Moreover, the expression of
he criteria is exactly the same as the corresponding properties for
erging set-valued information items viewed as constraints in our
aper. As a consequence, basic rules characterised by his criteria
re the same as the ones we obtain for merging sets: the intersec-
ion of consistent sets of states is replaced by the intersection of
redal sets, applying criteria 2 (our Impossibility Preservation) and
 (Optimism); he nevertheless obtains the union of sets as an ob-
ious consequence of criterion 4 (our Possibility Preservation) and
he debatable criterion 9. Actually, our Information Monotonicity
roperty is a consequence of the other ones for sets. 
Note that Walley does not consider all his criteria on a par. He
nly considers 1–4 as essential (our properties 1, 3, 5), and criteria
, 6, 9, 13, 14 as dubious (they correspond indeed to properties we
ither discarded or did not mention). 
Besides, minimal commitment is actually a major building block
f Walley’s theory, yielding the so-called natural extension. It al-
ays computes the least informative credal set in agreement with
vailable information (maximal credal set compatible with con-
traints [110] ). This is equivalent to choosing a set of desirable
ambles listed by an agent, using the 4 requirements (a-d) listed
t the beginning of this subsection, and that coherent sets of de-
irable gambles should satisfy. The setting of imprecise probability
heory has this feature, shared by possibility and belief function
heory, namely its concern to represent information at the exact
egree of inderminacy it contains. This is in opposition to single
robability distributions that cannot account for incompleteness
f information. In our general approach to information fusion, we
ound it instrumental to require minimal commitment as one of
he basic postulates, even if it seems to exclude a purely Bayesian
pproach to uncertainty. 
Moral and Sagrado [83] also consider postulates for merging
redal sets partially inspired by Walley’s. Interestingly, they again
ndorse Possibility and Impossibility Preservation, Insensitivity to
acuous Information, Commutativity, Optimism (requiring the con-
unction of credal sets as the proper fusion rule if they intersect),
nd a form of Information Monotonicity. They suggest to simplify
he input family of credal sets, by deleting the redundant ones, and
eplacing them by intersections of maximal consistent subsets of
he remaining ones. Then they propose a rather complex merging
rocess based on convex combinations. 
.3. Basic fusion rules in imprecise probability theory 
Walley [109] comes up with a number of merging rules that re-
ult from the conditions he posed, and that according to the above
nalysis ﬁt our framework. For simplicity, we only mention the fol-
owing ones, that are counterparts to fusion rules already encoun-
ered in other settings: 
• If the information items are mutually consistent, the conjunc-
tion rule obtains: f 
⋂ 
n (M 1 , . . . , M n ) = 
⋂ n 
i ∈ I M i . 
36 D. Dubois et al. / Information Fusion 32 (2016) 12–39 
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 • If the information items are pairwise mutually inconsistent, the
convex disjunction rule obtains: f ∪ n (M 1 , , M n ) = H( 
⋃ n 
i =1 M i ) ,
also called unanimity rule by Walley. 
• In the general case, Walley proposes the imprecise prob-
ability version of the MCS rule (4) : f MCS n (M 1 , . . . , M n ) =
H( 
⋃ 
I∈ MCS({ 1 , ... ,n } ) 
⋂ n 
i ∈ I M i  = ∅ ) . 
Noticeably, the three combination rules are the same as in the
case of set-based information items, replacing states by probability
measures. Like in the case of merging sets of states, the Walley-
unanimity (disjunctive) rule is questionable when the credal sets
proposed by sources are globally consistent (it violates Optimism),
and the conjunction rule is not coherent when sources are incon-
sistent. On the other hand, the MCS rule satisﬁes all of our postu-
lates, as well as those of Walley, but for the dubious criteria 5, 6, 9,
13, 14. It satisﬁes the updating criterion (Walley says), and reduces
to the conjunction rule if sources are globally inconsistent and to
the unanimity rule if they are pairwise mutually inconsistent. 
8.4. Probabilistic fusion methods 
The unanimity (disjunction) fusion is especially interesting
when merging single probabilities, which, as soon as they are
distinct are pairwise conﬂicting. Namely, if M i = { P i , i = 1 , . . . , n } ,
then f ∪ n (M 1 , . . . , M n ) = H({ P 1 . . . P n } ) . As pointed out by Walley,
this fusion rule is at odds with usual approach to probabilistic fu-
sion that results in a single probability measure that differs from
all other input probability measures, hence violating Fairness. This
is in particular true for one of the two main approaches to proba-
bilistic fusion described as follows: 
• The weighted average rule, promoted by Cooke [24] , of the
form f a v n (P 1 , . . . , P n ) = 
∑ n 
i =1 αi P i where 
∑ n 
i =1 αi = 1 . This rule
proves to be the only one ensuring that f (P 1 (A ) , . . . , P n (A )) is a
probability measure, assuming f (1 , . . . , 1) = 1 and f (0 , . . . , 0) =
0 , and being stable under marginalisation (Mc Conway [81] ,
Lehrer and Wagner [108] ) 12 . 
• The Bayesian fusion rule, which assumes pieces of informa-
tion take the form of observations w 1 , . . . , w n , along with con-
ditional probability functions (likelihoods) P (w i | w ) of observ-
ing w i if the real state is w . Then a prior probability P on W
is supposed to be available. It enables Bayes rule to be ap-
plied, yielding P (w | w 1 , . . . , w n ) , assuming in the simplest case
that P (w 1 , . . . , w n | w ) is obtained as ∏ n i =1 P (w i | w ) (this is called
naive Bayesian fusion). 
There are several diﬃculties when trying to apply our frame-
work to the above probabilistic combination rules. The weighted
average rule is generally not symmetric. Considering the mere
arithmetic average so as to stay in agreement with our assump-
tions, the issue is whether we consider a probability measure P
as a singleton { P }, i.e. as a very special credal set, as Walley [109]
did, or if we see P as just a kind of distribution pointing out some
states are more probable than other ones. 
In the ﬁrst view, as already pointed out, the result of the merg-
ing by arithmetic mean will be none of the input probabilities,
hence violating Impossibility Preservation. This point of view could
be challenged if we admit that sources can have different beliefs
(disjoint credal sets) about the state of the world while still be-
ing in relative agreement about what this state is. In other words,
for the subjective Bayesian, the notion of mutual consistency be-
tween credal sets adopted by Walley will sound too strong: the
fusion problem is not so much to check the overlap between { P 1 }
and { P } viewed as credal sets (which sounds barren), as the one of2 
12 This result has a counterpart in possibility theory in terms of weighted maxi- 
mum of possibility measures [47] . easuring consistency of P 1 and P 2 , viewed as restricting subsets
f possible states. 
And indeed, if we adopt the latter view with a strict Bayesian
pproach, we can encode any set-valued information item T as a
niform probability over its support following Laplace principle of
nsuﬃcient reason. Then we are bound to use the arithmetic mean
f characteristic functions of sets or fuzzy sets (properly renor-
alised in the guise of probability distributions) as the main fu-
ion tool to be evaluated in the face of our postulates. It is obvious
hat several postulates are then veriﬁed: Possibility and Impossi-
ility Preservation (with respect to possible states, not probabili-
ies as in the credal set view), Consistency Enforcement, Fairness,
ommutativity. However, Insensitivity to Vacuous Information is
learly not respected, if vacuous means uniform over W (but again
o Bayesian probabilistic information is vacuous...). Moreover, we
re at a loss deﬁning mutual consistency and information order-
ng for probability functions, which may prevent us from writing
he other postulates. Mutual consistency may just refer to non-
verlapping supports of distributions (a very weak form in proba-
ilistic terms). For information ordering, one way out is to compare
he entropies of the probability distributions. But then, Optimism
ould be violated by the arithmetic mean, since the entropy of the
verage of two overlapping distributions may be greater than the
nes of each input distribution, while Optimism requires that the
esulting informativeness should increase from merging consistent
nputs. 
Interestingly, the comparison between entropies of two prob-
bility distributions yields an ordering that reﬁnes the speciﬁcity
rdering of possibility distributions that can be obtained by a suit-
ble transformation (called the Lorentz curve) of these probabil-
ty distributions (see [35] for results in the ﬁnite setting and an
verview of this literature). In other words, if we consider prob-
bility distributions as one (very constrained) way of represent-
ng imprecise information (as is the case with subjective probabili-
ies), looking for postulates of merging in the style of our approach
eems to lead us back to the set-theoretic setting, for mutual con-
istency and information ordering. 
This is even more patent in the case of Bayesian fusion, where
nput information takes the form of likelihood functions that are
ell-known to be a kind of possibility distributions [23,39] . When
he prior information takes the form of a uniform distribution
ver W , what naive Bayesian fusion achieves is a variant of the
ormalised product fusion rule (6) of possibility distributions un-
er vacuous prior information (the normalisation factor is such
s to recover a probability measure). The Bayesian fusion actu-
lly combines revision (of the prior probability) and fusion (of
he likelihood functions); see [52] for more details and the coun-
erpart to Bayesian fusion in possibility theory, using possibilistic
riors. 
Note that as probabilities are special belief functions, the fusion
ules of evidence theory considered in the previous section still ap-
ly to combine independent probability functions P 1 and P 2 , if we
llow for the result to lie in a more general family of set-functions:
• The conjunctive rule of Smets leads to a submormalised distri-
bution such that P (w ) = P 1 (w ) · P 2 (w ) . It can be renormalised in
a standard way (this is Dempster rule) or by assigning the mass∑ 
w 1  = w 2 P 1 (w 1 ) · P 2 (w 2 ) to W , which is no longer a probability
distribution. This mass is generally quite high. 
• The DP fusion rule coincides with the disjunctive rule when ap-
plied to probabilities and yields a mass function bearing on sin-
gletons and doubletons: 
m DP ({ w } ) = P 1 (w ) · P 2 (w ) = m ∪ ({ w } ) 
m DP ({ w 1 , w 2 } ) = P 1 (w 1 ) · P 2 (w 2 ) + P 1 (w 2 ) · P 2 (w 1 ) 
= m ∪ ({ w 1 , w 2 } ) 
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 The corresponding belief function is deﬁned by Bel DP (A ) =
 1 (A ) · P 2 (A ) since, in general, Bel ∪ (A ) = Bel 1 (A ) · Bel 2 (A ) for the
isjunctive rule [42] . This approach is almost never used since it
s always assumed that merging probabilities must yield probabil-
ties. Yet the DP-rule, which is a special case of MCS, seems to be
easonable as it accounts for the discrepancies between sources in
 style similar to Walley’s unanimity rule. The latter computes the
redal set M = { λP 1 + (1 − λ) P 2 : λ ∈ [0 , 1] } and thus yields a more
nformative result than the DP rule, since the lower prevision it
rovides is P (A ) = min (P 1 (A ) , P 2 (A )) > Bel DP (A ) , but it is not a be-
ief function. 
.5. Ontic vs. epistemic views of credal sets 
At this point it is useful to reconsider imprecise probabilities
n the scope of the opposition between frequentist and subjectivist
iews of imprecise probability. Indeed, this debate sheds light on
he meaning of credal set fusion as envisaged by Walley [109] . If
e adopt the frequentist standpoint, a probability measure P rep-
esents a model of a random phenomenon, hence it can be viewed
s a possible world, and a credal set represents imprecise infor-
ation about the unknown probability. Hence we can argue that
e are back to the case of set-based information ( Section 4.1 ), re-
lacing deterministic states of the world by stochastic ones. This is
he sensitivity analysis interpretation of credal sets: a credal set is
ust a standard epistemic set, containing the actual probability dis-
ribution. No surprise then that Walley’s postulates ﬁt our general
etting, and were precisely pioneering it. And Walley’s unanimity
ule looks convincing as a way to reconcile credal sets represent-
ng imprecise probabilistic models of reality obtained from several
ources (in particular, the convex hull of alternative precise proba-
ilities). 
However, adopting the subjectivist standpoint under Walley’s
pproach, a credal set M does not represent imprecise knowl-
dge about an ill-known subjective probability, it represents the
gent’s beliefs in a singular event, just as in the previous section
f this paper. Walley considers [110] that there is no such thing
s an ill-known subjective probability: beliefs in imprecise proba-
ility theory are directly modelled by lower previsions and in par-
icular, lower probabilities (this is the so-called direct interpreta-
ion of lower prevision [110] , section 2.10). Hence, under this view
 credal set is not a model of an ill-known probability: it is the
ower prevision function that represent the agent’s epistemic state.
hen M is an ontic set [25,82] , a precise mathematical represen-
ation of the lower prevision function, which in turn may repre-
ent imprecise knowledge of a determinic state w ∈ W . Under this
iew, Walley’s setting for fusion becomes somewhat questionable.
he support of M should be the set of states having positive up-
er prevision S(M ) = { w : P (w ) > 0 } as in possibility and evidence
heories, not M itself (which is only compatible with an objec-
ivist view of probabilities). Interestingly, even if M 1 ∩ M 2 = ∅ , the
upports of S(M 1 ) and S(M 2 ) may overlap (obvious, consider-
ng the case singletons). So, while as epistemic representations of
 stochastic reality, M 1 and M 2 totally conﬂict, they may still be
artially mutually consistent as ontic representations of agent’s be-
iefs about a precise state in W . It suggests that directly expressing
erging rules in terms of lower or upper previsions may lead to
ostulates different from those using credal sets. Typically, Possi-
ility Preservation, in the form of Walley criterion 4, whose ex-
ression in terms of lower previsions is too complex; one may ar-
ue it should be written as S(M 1 ) ∩ S(M 2 ) ⊆ f (S (M 1 ) , S (M 2 )) ).
he fact that the interpretation of credal sets may affect the deﬁ-
ition of some basic notions pertaining to them is not surprising.
he same holds for the notions of independence in imprecise prob-
bility theory that differ if credal sets are imprecise descriptionsf probability functions or precise characterisations of lower previ-
ions [110] . 
These considerations suggest more work is needed to put in-
ormation fusion of lower previsions in the proper subjectivist per-
pective, and especially to ﬁnd some that are in agreement with
usion rules in possibility and evidence theories. 
. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have provided a general framework for
nalysing fusion operators proposed in different settings, in a uni-
ed way. We have investigated various representation formats in-
luding classical sets, knowledge bases, total pre-orders, possibility
heory, imprecise probabilities, and evidence theory, considering a
ew representative sampling of operators. It is clear that the analy-
is may be carried out even more systematically, as well as applied
o other settings, whether numerical or ordinal, e.g., ranking func-
ions [104] (that we nevertheless also discuss brieﬂy). 
Our aim was to propose a uniﬁed view of information fusion, as
he task of ﬁnding what is true out of a collection of testimonies,
y studying the conﬂicts between them, bypassing the boundaries
f various disciplines and formalisms. We could lay bare 8 univer-
al postulates that seem to ﬁt this purpose, and we showed they
re at work in most known fusion rules in the literature from vari-
us unrelated areas. Some properties not among the basic ones can
till be useful, in the sense that a fusion rule will be criticised if it
oes not satisfy them, like associativity (unlikely in the presence
f conﬂicting information), or insensitivity to small changes (e.g.
empster’s rule is oversensitive to small changes of input values).
ome other properties can be useful in some situations but not
ossessed by many fusion rules (e.g., idempotency). Our postulates
ave no claim to be relevant to other types of aggregation tasks
uch as voting, or preference merging, or multicriteria decision-
aking. We focalise here on imprecise or uncertain testimonies in
he form of elementary pieces of information. 
A natural line for further work is to adapt the basic proper-
ies to prioritised merging. It would lead us to an enlarged setting
here belief revision and fusion could be considered in the same
ange of formal framework, since belief revision can be viewed as a
orm of prioritised fusion, or yet constrained fusion, and Bayesian
usion methods are in the same vein. Some relevant preliminary
esults can be found in [26,32,60,67] . The study of combination
ules for dependent sources is another open issue. 
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